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ESSAY 
In This, the Winter of Our Discontent:        
Legal Practice, Legal Education,                   
and the Culture of Distrust 
ALFRED S. KONEFSKY†
BARRY SULLIVAN††
He at once went to his lawyer . . . . Now, Bold was not very fond of 
his attorney, but, as he said, he merely wanted a man who knew 
the forms of law, and who would do what he was told for his 
money. He had no idea of putting himself in the hands of a lawyer. 
He wanted law from a lawyer as he did a coat from a tailor . . . .
—Anthony Trollope1
† University at Buffalo Distinguished Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School.  
†† Cooney & Conway Chair and Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago 
School of Law; Arthur Cox Visiting Research Fellow and Visiting Professor, The 
Law School, Trinity College Dublin. 
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 1. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WARDEN 24 (The Heritage Press 1955) (1855). 
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and please forget 
about justice 
it doesn’t exist 
about brotherhood it’s deceit 
about love it has no right 
—Ingrid Jonker2
The sky is falling. Or so it seems. Perhaps it has fallen 
already. We can almost hear the shards crackle beneath our 
feet. In recent years, but particularly since the economic 
crisis of 2008, we have heard dire warnings of failing law 
schools and vanishing lawyers. Just a few years ago, 
American lawyers and legal educators were convinced that 
their institutions provided models for the world.3 They were 
a bit too self-confident, perhaps, and a bit too certain of 
 2. INGRID JONKER, I Am With Those, in SELECTED POEMS 50, 50 (Jack Cope & 
William Plomer trans., 1968). 
 3. Virtually from the beginning, American scholars have busied themselves 
in designing constitutions and laws for other nations. See GEORGE ATHAN 
BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD ROUND THE WORLD, 1776-1989: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 320-56 (2009); HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 13-21 (2000). See generally
Robert T. Brown, Simon Greenleaf and the Liberian Constitution of 1847, 9 
LIBERIAN STUD. J. 51 (1980). In the past, our Supreme Court also has often 
influenced the evolving jurisprudence of other countries, but that influence has 
now waned. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the 
United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 781 (2012). But see Mark 
Tushnet, Some Skepticism About Normative Constitutional Advice, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1473, 1495 (2008) (“Normative advice giving [by American 
academics] might occasionally have some beneficial effects, but in general the 
advice will be dominated by politics.”). American scholars and practitioners also 
worked to develop American-style legal infrastructures to support capitalism in 
the emerging democracies after 1989. See, e.g., Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: 
United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in 
the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 179, 188-89 
(1999). Finally, the practices of American legal education have been broadly 
influential. See, e.g., Matthew S. Erie, Legal Education Reform in China 
Through U.S.-Inspired Transplants, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 60, 76-77 (2009) 
(examining American influence on reform of Chinese legal education); Takahiro 
Saito, The Tragedy of Japanese Legal Education: Japanese “American” Law 
Schools, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 197, 197 (2006) (examining American influence on 
reform of Japanese legal education). 
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their ability to “teach the world to sing.”4 But their faith was 
sincere, and they were often encouraged in their efforts by 
colleagues in other countries, who recognized many things 
worth emulating in our institutions and practices. Indeed, 
we still hear songs of praise from abroad—where the rule of 
law sometimes seems fragile, judges often lack real 
independence, and lawyers frequently are less well trained.5
At home, we hear a different melody. A steady drumbeat in 
the popular press, major newspapers, the blogosphere, and 
scholarly interventions seems to signal that the end days 
are upon us.6
We have a somewhat different view. We do not doubt 
that there has been much unjustified complacency in legal 
education and practice, and we do not underestimate the 
gravity of the challenges that beset us. Nor do we doubt the 
desirability or the inevitability of change, either in legal 
education or in legal practice. Certainly, we are not 
unmindful of the very real ways in which the world has 
changed, particularly because of developments in 
 4. See THE NEW SEEKERS, I’D LIKE TO TEACH THE WORLD TO SING (IN PERFECT 
HARMONY) (Philips Records 1971).
5. See, e.g., David S. Clark, American Legal Education: Yesterday and 
Today, 10 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 93, 93 (2003) (“American legal education has 
never had a greater influence on the world scene than it has today.”); Carole 
Silver, Book Review, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 691, 691 (2012) (“U.S. legal education is 
under fire from all sides. . . . Travel outside of the U.S., however, and the 
analysis is completely different. There, the U.S. is a model for reform efforts, 
even the standard against which legal education programs in much of the rest of 
the world measure themselves.”). 
6. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2012, at SR10; Steven M. Davidoff, The Economics of Law 
School, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, at F8; see also Richard W. Bourne, The 
Coming Crash in Legal Education: How We Got Here, and Where We Go Now, 45 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 651, 697 (2012) (“Unless law schools reconfigure themselves, 
many will die on the vine, crushed by cost-structures incurred during good times 
and starved by an unwillingness of students to incur ever-increasing 
indebtedness to train for a much tighter job market.”); James Etienne Viator, 
Legal Education’s Perfect Storm: Law Students’ Poor Writing and Legal Analysis 
Skills Collide with Dismal Employment Prospects, Creating the Urgent Need to 
Reconfigure the First-Year Curriculum, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 735, 754-72 (2012) 
(arguing for revamped research and writing programs); Progress Report, INSIDE 
L. SCH. SCAM (Dec. 18, 2013, 6:51 AM), http://insidethelawschoolscam. 
blogspot.com.  
662 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
information technology,7 to say nothing of globalization and 
the worldwide recession. Nor do we doubt the pressing need 
to find more effective ways of ensuring that justice is 
equally available to everyone in our society, and not just to 
those who can afford to hire the highest-priced lawyers. We 
do not doubt the seriousness of the financial challenges 
faced by law students and recent graduates because of the 
high cost of higher education, mounting debt burdens, and 
diminished employment prospects. We are concerned, too, 
that the lack of appropriate employment opportunities for 
educated young people is not just a problem for the legal 
profession, nor, indeed, just for the United States. This is a 
problem felt in much of the world, where thoughtful leaders 
are rightly concerned with the staggering social costs and 
consequences of a lost generation of talent.8 Finally, we do 
not doubt the magnitude of the challenge confronting law 
schools, the profession, and society in general because of the 
current erosion of the law schools’ applicant pool.9
 7. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE 
NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2008). 
 8. See, e.g., Judith Crosbie, Higgins Slates Narrow Focus on Currency, IRISH 
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2013/ 
0112/1224328743121.html (“President Michael D. Higgins has criticised a focus 
in Europe ‘on the security of the currency’ while ‘happy to leave aside’ youth 
unemployment. He also criticized capitalism for ‘turning universities into 
businesses’ and citizens into clients.”); see also Gwynn Guilford, Ever-Growing 
Numbers of Spain’s Lost Generation Are Paying the Price of Austerity, QUARTZ,
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://qz.com/47153/spain-unemployment-lost-generation-are-
paying-the-price-of-austerity (detailing effects of employment on Spanish 
youth).  
 9. Concern about these issues is, of course, widespread within the legal 
profession and academy. Indeed, the American Bar Association (ABA) has taken 
the unusual step of empanelling a presidential task force on the future of legal 
education to report to the Council and the Accreditation Committee of the 
Section of Legal Education. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Task Force on the Future of 
Legal Education 1 (Aug. 1, 2013) (working paper), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/tas 
kforcecomments/aba_task_force_working_paper_august_2013.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 The task force was charged with examining certain problems faced by the 
system of legal education, namely, the “considerable pressure prompted by 
rising tuition, large amounts of student debt, falling applications, and limited 
availability of jobs for law graduates.” Id. It was “further charged to present 
recommendations for addressing these problems, which are workable and have a 
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What we do doubt is the wisdom of solutions that seem 
more based on panic or fear or opportunism, special 
pleading, and longstanding disaffection, than on sound and 
prudent reflection. We likewise doubt the wisdom of 
solutions based on the crudest and narrowest versions of 
economic analysis. 
A reasonable starting point for thinking constructively 
about these issues would be to take stock of the aims and 
purposes of the legal profession, the ways in which legal 
education can shape and serve those aims and purposes, 
and the connectedness of both legal practice and legal 
education to human flourishing, justice, the public interest, 
and the well-being of a democratic society. We could then 
proceed to think specifically about the role that legal 
education and the legal profession have played in promoting 
social mobility for individual lawyers as well as clients, and 
the effect that such mobility has had on the health of the 
society-at-large. The promise of upward mobility has been 
an important feature of American history, and it remains 
one today, when our society is so marked by inequality, 
particularly with respect to meaningful access to 
educational opportunity. That inequality begins with the 
earliest years of life, and its effects may persist to the end.  
Much of the current commentary on legal education 
takes a different tack, however, focusing on the most 
immediate and narrowly conceived needs and demands of 
what is now called the “legal industry.”10 Many critics simply 
reasonable chance of acceptance.” Id. Although the task force has issued a 
preliminary report that includes specific recommendations, it observed that 
“this document had to be prepared and submitted quickly” because “[t]he 
urgency of the problems, and the serious threats to public confidence, demanded 
rapid action.” Id. “Thus, the Task Force accelerated its schedule and set a goal 
of approximately one year to complete all work,” which “necessarily constrained 
its ability to gather information, test hypotheses, and vet recommendations with 
interested parties.” Id.
 10. See, e.g., Tonio D. DeSorrento & Geoffrey R. Thompson, Something Short 
of Selling Out: Derivatives-Based Innovation in the Legal Profession and Capital 
Markets, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 577, 597 (2008) (“Individual partners could 
invest in the legal industry. . . . A derivative product, then, can allow attorneys 
and other market participants to build wealth and hedge against years when 
their individual practices or firms underperform.”). Not so long ago, many 
lawyers complained that law practice was becoming nothing more than a 
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assume that the problems facing legal education and the 
legal profession are to be defined entirely in terms of the 
“market” (however vaguely defined), and that the solutions to 
those problems necessarily are to be found in the “market” as 
well.11 “Realism” is required, we are told, lest the “legal 
industry” and its educational infrastructure collapse.12
The literature fairly bristles with distrust and 
resentment. Law schools, for example, are charged with 
benefitting professors at the expense of students. There is 
some truth to that. Indeed, while most law professors are 
handsomely compensated, some do not pull their weight and 
others are driven entirely by self-interest. But there are 
many such people in every walk of life, and they find shelter 
in other institutions as well. It is also true that law school 
graduates face large debt loads and dreary job prospects, 
but the same is also true of groups as disparate as business 
and veterinary school graduates.13
“business,” but those voices seem to have fallen silent or are disregarded; many 
commentators now accept and embrace the idea that the practice of law is, can, 
and should be nothing more than a business. See Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal 
and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 
1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 
61 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (noting “the extraordinary outpouring of 
rhetoric, from all the public pulpits of the ideal—bar association and law school 
commencement addresses, memorial speeches on colleagues, articles and 
books—on the theme of the profession’s ‘decline from a profession to a 
business.’”). See generally JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR 
PROFESSION? (1916); Conference, The Law: Business or Profession? The 
Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the 
Twenty-First Century, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2012).  
 11. See, e.g., Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the 
Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 964 (2013) (“As the traditional 
market for professional services continues to experience significant disruption 
and permanent contraction, there will be corresponding employment 
opportunities for those with very particular forms of dual capacities.”).
 12. See, e.g., id. at 966 (“The future [of the profession] belongs to those 
institutions and individuals who act as though their livelihoods depend upon 
it—because in many cases they do.”). 
 13. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Job Gap, the Money Gap, and the 
Responsibility of Legal Educators, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2013); Melissa 
Korn, What’s Wrong with Wharton?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2013, at B1; David 
Segal, High Debt and Falling Demand Trap New Vets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 
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Thus, while some calls for reform are insightful, 
important, and long overdue, many suffer from a set of 
shared shortcomings: the critics’ failure to frame their 
inquiries with an openness to wider questions of 
professional identity and education, their refusal to credit 
the idea that human beings might not be most accurately 
described as helpless actors in a world determined by so-
called “market forces,” and their failure to credit the public 
role of the legal profession—a role which, despite all its 
limitations, contradictions, and shortcomings, reflects a 
commitment to advancing and fortifying the public good.  
Our purpose is not to defend the indefensible, still less 
to engage in sentimental calls for a return to some imagined 
golden age, when lawyers allegedly were indifferent to 
personal profit or well-being. American lawyers have always 
been interested in profit, but they also have been interested 
in more than that. Since the earliest days of the American 
legal profession, American lawyers have played a public role 
as well.  
But the critics have largely ignored the public role of 
the profession and the purposes of education in defining and 
fulfilling that role. In doing so, they undermine the force of 
their appraisal of our current plight and the credibility of 
their assessments and prescriptions. What is important now 
is that the profession be fortified to maintain the essential 
public role that it has traditionally inhabited, at the same 
time that its members continue, as they have in the past, to 
navigate the shoals and rapids of the marketplace.  
2013, at BU1; Alison Damast, At Top Business Schools, an MBA Application 
Drought, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 07, 2012), http://www.businessweek. 
com/articles/2012-09-07/at-top-business-schools-an-mba-application-drought; 
Patty Khuly, Declining Applications at Vet Schools: What . . . or Whom . . . Is To 
Blame?, PET MD (July 18, 2007), http://www.petmd.com/blogs/fullyvetted/ 
2007/july/declining-applications-vet-schools-whator-whomis-blame-6333; Edie 
Lau, When Dental Schools Closed: Lessons for Veterinary Profession?, VIN NEWS 
SERVICE (June 10, 2013), http://news.vin.com/VINNews.aspx?articleId=27460; 
Louis Lavelle, B-School Application Growth Stalls, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-09-12/b-school-
application-growth-stalls.  
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Our goal is not to endorse or deride any specific set of 
reforms. Our goal is simply to shift the focus of the 
discussion by attempting to situate the challenges we face 
within the broader context of professional culture—a 
context that seems to us to have been neglected in the 
sometimes feverish climate of the present debates. In a 
sense, as we will show, the “market reformers” have been 
swept up, consciously or not, in a wider movement that 
elevates markets over other forms of social analysis and 
therefore asserts and takes for granted what is in fact 
deeply contested. More specifically, they have pushed to the 
side the public-serving dimension of the lawyer’s role 
because it allegedly conflicts with the psychology of classical 
economic liberalism.  
Our aim, then, is to restore the concept of the public 
domain to a discussion now dominated by mere 
considerations of costs and a belief in the inevitable triumph 
of a narrowed sense of professional culture. Before we can 
begin to reform professional systems and institutions and 
their educational infrastructures, we first need to identify 
the purposes to be served by the legal profession in a 
democratic society and the role that a legal education might 
play in preparing men and women for service in a profession 
so conceived. In other words, the question we raise is this: 
how can we determine whether a legal education is cost- 
effective before we identify the purposes that a legal 
education is meant to serve?  
This Essay has three parts. In Part I, we discuss, in a 
general way, some of the changes that have occurred in 
society, the profession, and legal education in the past forty 
years or so. We are particularly interested in the growing 
tendency during this period to reconceptualize many social 
phenomena in market terms and the effects of this trend on 
legal education and the practice of law. In Part II, we 
continue our discussion of those themes, as they relate to 
the current debate over the future of legal education, by 
considering the analyses of Thomas D. Morgan and Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, both of whom approach the problem from the 
vantage point of economic analysis. Notwithstanding the 
similarities in their methodologies, their respective 
prescriptions point in somewhat different directions. We 
note the many useful insights in the work of both scholars, 
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but we also suggest that a broader view is necessary, and 
that the work of these commentators and others suffers 
from a failure to give sufficient attention to the public 
dimension and significance of the legal profession. In Part 
III, we again discuss the seriousness of the problems 
confronting legal education and the profession and endeavor 
to reframe the problem in a way that may be useful in 
developing a forward-looking approach to accomplishing the 
reforms that are necessary. 
I.
The challenges facing legal education and the profession 
have not developed in a vacuum. Nor can they be defined as 
simply confined to legal institutions. Many of the problems 
we face are not unique to law schools or the legal profession, 
and efforts to address them as if they were are bound to fail. 
The larger world also has changed dramatically, 
particularly because of globalization, digitalization, and the 
information explosion,14 to say nothing of the Great 
Recession, the increasing gap between rich and poor,15 and 
the extent of youth unemployment, particularly among 
minority groups.16 Much of the current criticism fails to 
 14. SUSSKIND, supra note 7, at 62-65. 
15. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 5-6, 93 (2012) (noting that the 
excessive emphasis placed on markets, deregulation, and commodification over 
the past thirty years has resulted in the highest levels of inequality since the 
Great Depression, the undermining of growth, a warping of the political system, 
and an underinvestment in public goods). One measure of the widening gap 
between rich and poor is the ratio of CEO pay to that of the average worker, 
which increased from 24 to 1 in 1950 to 380 to 1 in 2011. See LINDA HOLBECHE &
GEOFFREY MATTHEWS, ENGAGED: UNLEASHING YOUR ORGANIZATION’S POTENTIAL 
THROUGH EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT 29 (2012); CEO Pay, Low Tax Rates & Tax 
Evasion, BUD MEYERS BLOG (Apr. 28, 2012, 7:19 AM), http://bud-meyers.
blogspot.com/2012/04/ceo-pay-low-tax-rates-tax-evasion.html. For example, in 
2011, the CEO of McDonald’s made 580 times the compensation paid to a 
McDonald’s average full-time, minimum-wage employee. See Leslie Patton, 
McDonald’s $8.25 Man and $8.75 Million CEO Shows Pay Gap, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (Dec. 12, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-12/
mcdonald-s-8-25-man-and-8-75-million-ceo-shows-pay-gap.html. 
 16. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data demonstrate a persistent gap in the 
unemployment rate between whites (6.4%), Hispanics (9.3%), and blacks 
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situate the apparent turmoil in legal education in relation 
to these widespread social changes. For that reason, we first 
frame the inquiry in Part I.A. by considering the broader 
cultural forces and trends that have been in play. In Part 
I.B., we consider some of the ways in which some of these 
forces and trends have affected legal education and the 
profession.  
A.
Almost a decade ago, David Marquand, the English 
academic, public intellectual, and sometime 
parliamentarian, published Decline of the Public: The 
Hollowing Out of Citizenship, in which he lamented the 
ongoing decline in England of what he called “the public 
domain,” that is, “the domain of citizenship, equity and 
service whose integrity is essential to democratic 
governance and social well-being.”17 For Marquand, the 
public domain is “the domain where the public interest is 
defined and public goods produced.”18
It is best understood [not as a sector, but] as a dimension of social 
life, with its own norms and decision rules, cutting across sectoral 
boundaries: as a set of activities which can be (and historically 
have been) carried out by private individuals, private charities 
and even private firms as well as public agencies. It is 
symbiotically linked to the notion of a public interest, in principle 
distinct from private interests; central to it are the values of 
citizenship, equity and service.19
(13.0%). Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—
August 2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
empsit_09062013.pdf. Similar gaps exist in Europe. See Leo Kaas & Christian 
Manger, Ethnic Discrimination in Germany’s Labour Market: A Field 
Experiment, 13 GERMAN ECON. REV. 1, 2-3 (2011) (finding that job applicants 
with German-sounding names are more likely to receive interviews than 
applicants with Turkish-sounding names).  
 17. DAVID MARQUAND, DECLINE OF THE PUBLIC: THE HOLLOWING OUT OF 
CITIZENSHIP 1 (2004). 
 18. Id. at 26. 
 19. Id. at 27. 
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Marquand put forward “three interconnected 
propositions” concerning the essence of the public domain.20
Those propositions, and what Marquand had to say about 
them, are worth recalling: 
The first [of the three propositions] is that the public domain has 
its own distinctive culture and decision rules. In it citizenship 
rights trump both market power and the bonds of clan or kinship. 
Professional pride in a job well done or a sense of civic duty or a 
mixture of both replaces the hope of gain and the fear of loss (and, 
for that matter, loyalty to family, friends or dependants) as the 
spur to action. The second proposition is that the public domain is 
both priceless and precarious – a gift of history, which is always at 
risk. It can take shape only in a society in which the notion of a 
public interest, distinct from private interests, has taken root; 
and, historically speaking, such societies are rare breeds. Its 
values and practices do not come naturally, and have to be 
learned. . . . [T]he public domain depends on careful and 
continuing nurture. The third proposition is that, in Britain, the 
last twenty years have seen an aggressively interventionist state 
systematically enfeebling the institutions and practices that 
nurtured [the public domain], and that it is now in crisis.21
In an important sense, of course, the “decline of the 
public” that Marquand described in the England of that 
time was more the result of intended demolition than 
simple decline.  
For those who held an alternative vision of social 
reality—one in which self-interest, competition, market 
rationality, unbridled market forces, and the efficiency that 
those forces allegedly produce as a matter of course—the 
public domain and its values signified nothing more than an 
obstacle to be overcome or, indeed, a cancer to be excised. 
The concept of a public interest distinct from private 
interests was the stuff of nursery rooms and fairy tales, as 
was the idea that human beings might be motivated by 
anything other than individual self-interest. For those 
espousing that social vision, it was necessary to 
anathematize the values of the public domain—deemed 
false values—as serving no purpose other than to exploit 
sentiment and camouflage privilege and rent-seeking. Even 
 20. Id. at 1.  
 21. Id. at 1-2. 
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more important, the triumph of the market was billed as 
the inevitable product of historical forces beyond the 
influence, let alone the control, of any value system, 
individual, group, profession, or other institution of civil 
society.
Marquand argued that “[t]he single most important 
element of the [English] New Right program of the 1980s 
and 1990s was a relentless kulturkampf designed to root out 
the culture of service and citizenship which had become 
part of the social fabric.”22 He continued: 
Incessant marketization . . . has done even more damage to the 
public domain than low taxation and resource starvation. It has 
generated a culture of distrust, which is corroding the values of 
professionalism, citizenship, equity and service like acid in the 
water supply. For the marketizers, the professional, public-service 
ethic is a con. Professionals are self-interested rent-seekers, trying 
to force the price of their labour above its market value. The 
service ethic is a rhetorical device to legitimize a web of 
monopolistic cartels whose real purpose is to rip off the consumer. 
There is no point in appealing to the values of common 
citizenship. There are no citizens: there are only customers. Public 
servants cannot be trusted to give of their best. They are 
inherently untrustworthy. If they are allowed autonomy, they will 
abuse it. Like everyone else, they can be motivated only by sticks 
and carrots.23
England in the late twentieth century may provide the 
textbook case, but the decline of the public has not been an 
entirely English phenomenon. The decline of the public also 
resonates in the American experience of the past forty 
years.  
On this side of the Atlantic, a few years before 
Marquand began his summing up of the situation in 
England, Robert Kuttner, a prominent journalist and 
occasional university lecturer, made some of the same 
points about the United States. According to Kuttner:  
By agreeing to a sterilized idiom of market failures, externalities, 
and the like, one can back into an acceptance of an overly 
mechanical view of economic man, in which narrow conclusions 
 22. Id. at 2. 
 23. Id. at 3. 
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necessarily follow from narrow premises, realities of political and 
market power are excluded, and entire debates about the nature 
of the good society are foreclosed by tacit definition.24
In Kuttner’s view, that is precisely what had happened 
in the United States. As Kuttner observed, “enthusiasts of 
markets have claimed that most of human activity can and 
should be understood as nothing but a series of markets, 
and that outcomes would be improved if constraints on 
market behavior were removed.”25
Kuttner continued: 
In the past quarter-century, a good deal of economic theory has 
become less the study of “the allocation of scarce resources,” and 
more the simple celebration of markets. A more complex model of 
human behavior, reflecting twentieth-century insights about 
psychology, has reverted to a simplified nineteenth-century 
conception of rationality. A more complex view of society has given 
way to the claim that most issues boil down to material incentives, 
and most social problems are best resolved by constructing or 
enhancing markets. And, indeed, fewer people today enjoy 
protections against the uglier face of the market, or social income 
as a right of citizenship. More aspects of human life are on the 
auction block. Champions of market society insist that all of this 
makes us better off.26
“For two centuries,” Kuttner noted, “critics, left and 
right, have observed that a functioning society requires 
more than a series of markets; that civic life requires people 
 24. ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF 
MARKETS 230-31 (1996). Kuttner likewise observed that “[i]n a stylized 
taxonomy of why and when to regulate, it is all too easy to ignore . . . that 
failure to regulate would not have yielded efficient laissez-faire markets but 
would merely have entrenched a different set of inequities and inefficiencies.” 
Id. at 230. 
 25. Id. at 39. More recently, Michael J. Sandel has drawn a distinction 
between what he terms market economies and market societies: “A market 
economy is a tool—a valuable and effective tool—for organizing productive 
activity. A market society is a way of life in which market values seep into every 
aspect of human endeavor. It’s a place where social relations are made over in 
the image of the market.” MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 10-11 (2012). 
 26. KUTTNER, supra note 24, at 39. 
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to be more than self-interested maximizers of their own 
utility.”27
Suddenly, the wisdom of left and right was left behind. 
Now, it was thought that societies could, should, and, 
indeed, must be built on an understanding of human beings 
as only “self-interested maximizers of their own utility.”28
The new marketization meant “that market institutions
[would] drive out extra-market institutions,” and “market 
norms [would] drive out” extra-market norms.29 Firms 
thought to be undervalued became the target of takeovers 
and increasingly were operated, not by people who knew the 
industry, let alone the community, but by investment 
bankers who presumably knew how to maximize value 
before selling out and moving on.30
The outsourcing of jobs and other market-oriented 
strategies aimed at maximizing value (usually measured in 
terms of short-term gains that could be easily liquidated 
and reinvested) spread from manufacturing and commerce 
to professional service firms and universities.31 They also 
spread from lower-wage, lower-skilled jobs to what had been 
 27. Id. at 48; see also DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE (2011) (criticizing 
the overzealous application to other social sciences of market principles that 
gained popularity in the 1960s and 70s); see generally ANGUS BURGIN, THE 
GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE DEPRESSION (2012); 
DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE 
BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS (2012). 
 28. KUTTNER, supra note 24, at 48. Fortunately, other economists have taken 
a more nuanced view of human motivation. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) 
(“Our goal . . . is to advance an approach to the economic analysis of law that is 
informed by a more accurate conception of choice, one that reflects a better 
understanding of human behavior and its wellsprings.”); see also DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 378-85 (2011) (demonstrating that 
individuals do not act solely to maximize their own utility). 
 29. KUTTNER, supra note 24, at 48. 
 30. According to Kuttner, “[m]any of the takeovers . . . turned out to be bad 
deals. This is hardly surprising, since, as Michael Lewis put it in Liar’s Poker,
they were often the result of a twenty-six-year-old apprentice investment 
banker playing with his computer rather than a move by someone who knew 
something about the industry.” Id. at 184. 
 31. See id. at 73-75.  
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higher-wage, higher-skilled jobs.32 “These strategies 
allow[ed] employers to escape all the implicit contracts and 
reciprocal obligations that characterized the labor-
management regime of a generation ago. If an employee is 
not permanently attached to the payroll, you don’t really 
owe her anything beyond a day’s pay for a day’s work.”33 In 
other words, the alienation of labor was complete; work was 
understood purely in market terms. The social and moral 
character of work was no longer acknowledged. Nor were 
the moral and social dimensions of the relationship between 
employer and employee.34 Not insignificantly, the size of the 
gap between executive and worker compensation increased 
geometrically.35
A profound sense of transience and insecurity came to 
permeate most, if not all, levels of management and labor. 
With no assurance of what tomorrow might bring, many 
came to focus on maximizing gain for the short term, while 
perhaps-fleeting opportunities for profit still lay before 
them. Even the nature of human relationships changed; 
human beings were encouraged to see the world—and each 
other—in a different light. In this view, no one can be 
trusted; all act only from self-interest and estimates of 
personal profit and loss; all are natural shirkers. As 
Kuttner noted: 
When everything is for sale, the person who volunteers time, who 
helps a stranger, who agrees to work for a modest wage out of 
commitment to the public good, who desists from littering even 
 32. See id. at 73-74.  
 33. Id. at 75. 
 34. See id. at 69, 73. 
 35. The average total compensation for chief executive officers of S&P 500 
companies rose 13.9% from the year before, to $12.94 million in 2011. CEO Pay, 
Low Tax Rates & Tax Evasion, supra note 15. In 2010, total compensation had 
increased 22.8% from its 2009 level. Id. In 2012, total CEO compensation was 
354 times that of the average worker. See Executive Paywatch: CEO Pay and 
You, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/CEO-Pay-and-You (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2014). In 1982, CEO compensation was forty-two times that of 
the average worker. Id.
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when no one is looking, who foregoes an opportunity to free-ride, 
begins to feel like a sucker.36
There is no possibility of appeals to honesty or integrity, 
to a proper concern for the well-being of one’s fellow man, to 
the public good, or to one’s sense of pride in a job well-done. 
All is self-interest; all is carrots; all is sticks. In this view, 
the market even trumps democratic politics and 
government. Indeed, some have argued that voting is itself 
irrational: “[A] rational individual will choose not to expend 
effort on legislative or civic life, since the ‘cost’ (in 
information gathered and time expended) will invariably 
outweigh the scant individual benefit.”37
In the United States, as Joseph Stiglitz has noted, the 
emphasis placed on markets, deregulation, and 
commodification during the last thirty years not only has 
resulted in the highest levels of inequality since the Great 
Depression, but has undermined growth and efficiency and 
warped the political system.38 “Part of the reason for this is 
that much of America’s inequality is the result of market 
distortions, with incentives directed not at creating new 
wealth but at taking it from others,” particularly from the 
“poor and uninformed,” as was the case with the financial 
sector, which “made enormous amounts of money by preying 
upon these groups with predatory lending and abusive 
credit card practices.”39 (Of course, the financial sector did 
not act alone; it was aided by the good work of talented 
lawyers at every step of the way.) At the same time, the 
United States has underinvested in public goods—“in 
infrastructure, basic research, and education at all levels.”40
As Stiglitz has observed, “[t]he more divided a society 
 36. KUTTNER, supra note 24, at 62-63. 
 37. Id. at 336. 
 38. See STIGLITZ, supra note 15, at 5-6 (noting, not endorsing, this view). 
 39. Id. at 6, 37; see also STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE 
SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW 3 (2013) (“[T]hose 
possessing excessive economic resources will rationally seek to subvert the rule 
of law in order to entrench their privileged position and insulate themselves 
from competition, at the expense of an optimal legal infrastructure to support 
macroeconomic growth.”).  
 40. STIGLITZ, supra note 15, at 93. 
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becomes in terms of wealth, the more reluctant the wealthy 
are to spend money on common needs.”41 But that is short-
sighted as well as selfish: “The success of . . . firms, and 
indeed the viability of our entire economy, depends heavily 
on a well-performing public sector.”42
Just as the decline of the public was deemed to be 
inevitable by many in England, so we are told in the United 
States that market forces will continue to produce dramatic 
changes in the way we live, that those forces are irresistible, 
that those changes are inevitable, and that no value system, 
individual, group, profession, or other institution of civil 
society can possibly prevail against them. We are told that 
there is but one value on which we can all agree, which is 
the desirability of a robust and unbridled market that 
allows for the unfettered accumulation of individual wealth.  
That is true, we are told, even if honoring that value 
results in a greater and greater concentration of wealth in 
fewer and fewer hands. Indeed, we are told that 
increasingly great concentrations of wealth are both 
empirically inevitable and normatively desirable. The idea 
of the public interest is myth. However, the useful myth of 
upward mobility is no myth at all.43 Nor is the myth that 
formal equality is the same as equal opportunity. On this 
view, unfettered competition is not only good in its place, 
but good in itself; competition should be maximized every 
day, in every way, and in every venue. Somehow, that is the 
recipe for success, both for individuals and for nations, in a 
global community.  
 41. Id.
 42. Id. at 92; see also TONY JUDT, ILL FARES THE LAND 2 (2010) (“Much of 
what appears ‘natural’ today dates from the 1980s: . . . . uncritical admiration 
for unfettered markets, disdain for the public sector, the delusion of endless 
growth. We cannot go on living like this.”). 
 43. See LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42400, THE U.S. INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION AND MOBILITY: TRENDS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 1 (2012) 
(“Research raises questions about whether Americans’ perceptions of their 
likelihood of upward mobility are exaggerated. Empirical analyses estimate that 
the United States is a comparatively immobile society . . . .”); see also Anne 
Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 599-602 (2000). 
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This is crude economics. Indeed, as more behaviorally 
oriented scholars have demonstrated, it rests on an 
incomplete view of human nature and an inadequate theory 
of human motivation.44 Yet it remains a formidable part of 
the prevailing ideology, which set in motion a great new 
transformation, spurring a reconsideration of the role of the 
professions and education, including the practice of law and 
the education of lawyers. 
B.
To be sure, there has been much complacency in 
American legal education and practice, and the challenges 
that beset us now are serious indeed. They are not all due, 
however, to the failure of the legal academy and profession 
to respond to market realities. Many of our fellow citizens 
lack confidence in our justice system. Despite an apparent 
surplus of lawyers, the middle class and the poor frequently 
lack access to legal services.45 The outcome of disputes often 
seems to depend not on principle but on the relative 
financial resources of the parties.46
The practice of law has changed dramatically in recent 
years, but relatively few academic lawyers have explored 
the causes or consequences, let alone the desirability, of 
those changes.47 The price of legal education is excessive, 
 44. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 28, at 13-14.  
 45. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1785 
(2001) (“An estimated four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and the 
needs of an estimated two- to three-fifths of middle-income individuals, remain 
unmet.”). 
 46. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
 47. Generally speaking, the academic study of the profession has not 
garnered broad interest within the legal academy. See William H. Rehnquist, 
The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 152 (1987) (“But . . . law school 
faculties . . . very rarely . . . evince any interest in the sort of empirical studies 
that might shed light on [fundamental changes in the legal profession]. Law 
school faculties have preferred to devote themselves . . . to criticism and analysis 
of legal doctrine . . . .”). However, the exceptions are notable. See generally 
RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON 
THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO (1962); MARC
GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
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but there is little consensus, if any, as to what constitutes a 
sound legal education. 
Lawyers in the public sector face many of the same 
problems that other public employees face at present—when 
public sector austerity is the prescribed remedy for a weak 
economy, the very need for government is questioned, and 
public employees are scapegoated. Budget cuts have left 
many government lawyers—from those who enforce the 
securities and banking laws to those who prosecute drug 
trafficking and street crime—hopelessly overworked. Public 
defenders often lack sufficient resources to provide effective 
representation.48 There are fewer jobs for new graduates 
and little time for mentoring those who are hired. 
In the private sector, competition is king. The economics 
of law practice are tough. In relatively prosperous firms, the 
controlling partners have come to expect their own 
compensation to increase every year, regardless of economic 
conditions.49 That has become increasingly difficult to 
sustain, especially in the years following 2008.50 Information 
THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO 
LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL.,
URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005); LYNN MATHER 
ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE
(2001); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988); ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER:
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? (1964); Marc Galanter & William 
Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law 
Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867 (2008). 
 48. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can 
Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 689 (2010) (“[P]ublic 
defenders will have no alternative except to resign if they are forced to take on 
more cases than they can competently and ethically handle.”). 
 49. See generally NELSON, supra note 47, at 227 (“In the law firm the power of 
the dominant colleagues derives from their relationships with clients.”); Michael 
D. Freeborn, Reining the Rainmaker, 85 ILL. B.J. 231, 231 (1997) (noting the 
deification of rainmakers); Robert W. Hillman, Professional Partnerships, 
Competition, and the Evolution of Firm Culture: The Case of Law Firms, 26 J.
CORP. L. 1061, 1067 (2001) (noting reallocation of firm income and management 
responsibility to rainmakers). 
 50. The world of large law firms had changed dramatically by end of the 
1990s, but the pace of change accelerated during the recession that followed the 
bombing of the World Trade Center in September 2001 and once again during 
the Great Recession. See Linda Sorenson Ewald, Agreements Restricting the 
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about the profitability of law firms (measured in terms of 
“profits-per-partner”) is widely available, and partners in 
one firm can measure the size of their success against their 
peers in other firms.51 Likewise, information about the 
compensation paid to in-house counsel is often a matter of 
public record. Those lawyers, once disdained by many large 
firm lawyers,52 frequently provide the compensation 
Practice of Law: A New Look at an Old Paradox, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 31-32 
(2002) (“‘[A] revolution in the practice of law has occurred requiring economic 
interests of the law firm to be protected as they are in other business 
enterprises.’” (quoting Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 156 (Cal. 1993))); 
Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, 
Practical Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598, 599 
(2010) (“The economic recession of 2008-2009 has placed unprecedented stress 
on the legal profession. Although smaller downturns in 1990-1992 and 2000-
2001 created similar problems, the current recession likely will outstrip them in 
duration and intensity.”); Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great Recession and the 
Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2051, 2051-52 (2010) (noting the 
devastating effect of the economic meltdown on the legal profession). According 
to one source, by the end of 2009, the top 250 law firms had shed 5259 lawyers. 
Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, So, You Want to Be a Lawyer? The Quest 
for Professional Status in a Changing Legal World, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289, 
2297 n.43 (2009) (citing Karen Sloan, Where Have All the Flowers Gone?, NAT’L
L.J., Dec. 21, 2009, at 12). 
 51. The American Lawyer published its first annual Am Law 50 list of the 
nation’s largest firms in 1985. The rankings rely heavily on profits-per-
partner—a rigid criterion that some observers credit with undermining lawyer 
satisfaction. See Steven Harper, Harper on Rankings, 10 PARTNER’S REPORT 10 
(2010) (“Most firm leaders now adhere to the Am Law measures, annually 
seeking to maximize revenues and average profits per equity partner. The 
resulting culture of billings, billable hours, and associate/partner leverage ratios 
begins to explain why large-firm lawyers lead the profession in career 
dissatisfaction. Without a metric to measure it, attorney well-being drops out of 
the equation.”). Profits-per-partner at large law firms grew from a range of 
$200,000-$500,000 in 1986 to up to $4,460,000 in 2012. See Rising and Falling 
on the Am Law 100 Across 25 Years, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Mar. 1, 2012), 
available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=120254892 
3245; The Am Law 100 2012, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (May 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202597273265.  
 52. See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in 
Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1057, 1057-58 (1997) (identifying two of the most significant changes 
over the past thirty years as “the growth in number, prestige and power of in-
house counsel and the globalization of the business and capital markets”) 
(footnote omitted). 
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benchmarks now, with large salaries, bonuses, stock 
options, and other benefits.53 They also control the 
important flow of legal work to particular firms, and, not 
insignificantly, to particular partners in those firms.54
Because of their structure, many large law firms are not 
especially well managed,55 and it is often difficult to 
determine for whose benefit firm decisions are made.56 As 
firms grew over the past several decades,57 they continued to 
 53. According to the 2012 Corporate Counsel Compensation Survey, the 
average compensation for the top fifty general counsels of Fortune 500 
companies ranged from $14,611,037 (CBS) down to $2,596,297 (Fluor). Shannon 
Green, The 2012 GC Compensation Survey, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1341783741529
&slreturn= 20130017104428. 
 54. See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite 
Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 294-98 (1985) (characterizing general counsel’s 
tendency to “shop around” when seeking legal advice as the result of a “more 
professionalized” business management approach fostered by a bureaucratized 
corporate hierarchy); Andrew Schaeffer et al., The Modern Beauty Contest,
LITIG., Spring 2009, at 29, 33 (“One general counsel reports that when she sees 
lavish buffet lunches, limos to the airport at the firm’s beck and call, silver tea 
and coffee services, and the like, she knows who is ultimately paying for it. She 
is more impressed by an office piled with papers, a week’s supply of coffee cups 
on the windowsill, and an administrative assistant who is busy and only has 
time to point to the coat closet. She then knows that she has a hardworking firm 
that is probably hungry for business.”). 
 55. LAURA EMPSON, MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW CHALLENGES xviii 
(2007) (“Has the law firm become . . . an anachronistic model that is creaking 
and groaning at the seams? Critics argue that the classic law firm organization 
is no longer able to deal with the sheer size and complexity that many large 
firms have attained.”). Large law firms receive the greatest amount of scholarly 
attention, but account for a relatively small percentage of lawyers in private 
practice. Of the 75% of American lawyers in private practice in 2005, 49% were 
solo practitioners, 18% worked in firms with six to fifty lawyers, and 20% 
worked in firms of more than fifty lawyers. See AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER 
DEMOGRAPHICS (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2012_ 
revised.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 56. See Elizabeth Chambliss, New Sources of Managerial Authority in Large 
Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 63, 79 (2009) (“[T]op partners have 
individual economic incentives to protect the status quo and will use the threat 
of departure to maintain it. Thus, top partners will block management changes 
that would benefit the firm.”). 
 57. Between 1975 and 1985, large firms grew at an annual rate of 8%. 
GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 47, at 46, app. A at 143-44. The number of law 
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be organized as partnerships, but “partnership” became a 
thinner concept.58 Except for those in the control group of a 
firm, partners began to resemble employees more than 
owners.59
Firms that wished to compete for the biggest cases and 
transactions found that they needed large standing armies 
that required regular rations, even when there was no 
firms with more than 250 partners rose from five in 1991 to forty-eight in 2005. 
See The NLJ 250: Annual Survey of the Nation’s Largest Law Firms (Nov. 14, 
2005). Many firms are so large that even partners can have little more than a 
nodding acquaintance with each other. Twenty-two American firms now have 
more than 1000 attorneys. Baker & McKenzie, which tops the NLJ 350 list, 
touts more than 4000 lawyers working in seventy-two offices in forty-five 
countries. The NLJ 350: By the Numbers, AM. LAW (Apr. 16, 2012),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleALD.jsp?id=1202548783905.  
 58. Few law partnerships were equal partnerships in the sense of 
compensating all partners equally, although some reportedly compensated 
members of certain seniority cohorts equally. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. 
Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the 
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 341 
(1985) (describing the cohort compensation system). But many firms, in keeping 
with principles of partnership democracy, permitted everyone to have an equal 
voice in firm affairs, even if it remained possible to call for a “points vote,” which 
favors those with a larger ownership interest. See Robert W. Hillman, Law, 
Culture, and the Lore of Partnership: Of Entrepreneurs, Accountability, and the 
Evolving Status of Partners, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 796, 809-10 (2005) 
(“Equality has long been a norm of partnership law. . . . An emphasis on the 
relationship among partners rather than the relationship between the firm (an 
artificial entity) and its partners is consistent with the classic egalitarian model 
of the partnership as a collaborative effort among individuals joined through a 
contractual bond in a common enterprise.”); Janice Mucalov, What to Look for in 
a Partnership Agreement, CBA PRACTICELINK, http://www.cba.org/ 
cba/practicelink/wwp/agreement.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2014) (“Day-to-day 
decisions usually require a simple majority. Fundamental changes and 
important matters often need a two-thirds or three-quarters majority vote of 
partners. Note that not all votes may be equal. In firms where partners are 
allocated points or partnership units, the firm may have weighted votes – so if a 
partner has 100 partnership points, they will have double your voting power if 
you come in with 50 points.”). In many firms, such votes were viewed as divisive 
and undesirable and were generally avoided. See Hillman, supra, at 810.  
 59. Hillman, supra note 58, at 820 (“If a partner’s claim to income largely is 
in the form of a salary, the partner bears no responsibility for claims against the 
firm, and the partner does not participate meaningfully in firm governance, 
then the label ‘partner’ has no substantive meaning whatsoever and the 
individual so described is an employee rather than a partner.”). 
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battle immediately to be fought. One solution was to try and 
keep a steady stream of such work by using promises of 
handsome compensation to recruit (or keep) proven 
“rainmakers.”60 Another was to acquire whole firms or 
practice groups with enviable “books of business.”61 Yet 
another solution was to “outsource” the firm’s more routine 
work62 or hire a cohort of lower-status, lower-paid lawyers to 
do it.63
Firms also sought to arrange matters so that they 
looked particularly profitable, because profitable businesses 
like to be represented by profitable law firms.64 They 
 60. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 47, at 54-57; see also MILTON C. REGAN,
JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 37-38 (2004) 
(discussing the division in firms between “service partners” (work-horses) and 
“rainmakers” (business generators)); William D. Henderson & Leonard 
Bierman, An Empirical Analysis of Lateral Lawyer Trends from 2000 to 2007: 
The Emerging Equilibrium for Corporate Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1395, 1399 (2009) (“Wanting to attract and retain lawyers with the largest 
books for price-insensitive work, law firm managers increasingly focus on the 
profits per partner as reported to The American Lawyer rather than a long-term 
business strategy that delivers a highly valued and cost-effective service to 
clients.”). 
 61. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 47, at 54-55; Henderson & Bierman, supra
note 60, at 1421.  
 62. See generally Jose A. Arambulo, Comment, O Where, O Where Has My 
Legal Job Gone?: Examining the Realities of “Offshoring” Legal Work and Why 
States Can Regulate the Practice Despite Congress’ Broad Power Under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause, 38 SW. L. REV. 195 (2008) (discussing outsourcing to 
gain a competitive advantage). 
 63. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 169 (2012); Catherine 
Rampell, At Well-Paying Law Firms, a Low-Paid Corner, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
2011, at A1; Sara Randazzo, Calling All Unemployed Law Grads: Greenberg Is 
Hiring, AM LAW DAILY (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/
id=1202624550961 (describing how Greenberg Traurig is hiring new associate 
classes, but pay for “[t]hose who sign on will be . . . considerably less than the 
typical starting associate,” and they “will bill at a much lower hourly rate—and 
may wind up only sticking with the firm for a year”).  
 64. Cf. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational Infrastructure of Law 
Firm Culture and Regulation: The Exaggerated Death of Big Law, 42 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 109, 141 (2013) (noting that Big Law has responded to the rise in in-
house counsel positions by cutting costs to retain clients and remain profitable). 
See generally Barry Sullivan, Professions of Law, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1235 
(1996) (book review); Barry Sullivan, Book Review, 5 LEGAL ETHICS 179 (2002).  
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competed for the most prestigious addresses, the most 
opulent offices, and the most highly credentialed 
associates.65 Above all, they attempted to report the most 
impressive profits-per-partner numbers.66 To that end, they 
terminated—or “de-equitized”67—long-time partners who 
practiced in a less-lucrative specialty or were perceived as 
“underperforming” in one way or another. In that way, they 
 65. They recruited the “best” students from the “best” schools, with lavish 
dinners and other demonstrations of firm prosperity, summer programs in 
which the recreation-to-work ratio was high, and starting salaries that were 
unrelated to the value that new associates were capable of producing. See 
NELSON, supra note 47, at 66 (“The leading position of large firms is historically 
linked to their ability to recruit the best graduates from the best law schools.”); 
Tom Ginsburg & Jeffrey A. Wolf, The Market for Elite Law Firm Associates, 31 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 909, 927 (2004); Chris Mondics, Many Law Firms Are Cutting 
Back on Summer Internships, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2010, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/19/business/la-fi-law-interns-20100719; Lisa 
van der Pool, Law Firms Launch Leaner Summer Associate Classes, BOS. BUS.
J., May 11, 2009, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/ 
2009/05/11/newscolumn1.html?surround=etf&ana=e_article. The median base 
starting salary for new law school graduates was $18,000 in 1977; by 2000 it 
stood at $85,000. See Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to 
Greed to Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money, and Professional Integrity, 30 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 879, 883 (2002). By 2007, base starting salaries in elite New York law 
firms reached $160,000. Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: 
Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 21. Those that could afford to do so competed for the 
highest status symbols: Supreme Court clerks. See Brent Kendall, High-Court 
Clerks Attract a Frenzy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2012, at B1 (observing that large 
corporate firms typically offer Supreme Court clerks a signing bonus of 
$280,000, which is more than the annual salaries earned by the Justices). 
 66. See Lerman, supra note 65, at 883-84.  
 67. “De-equitization,” the demotion of a partner from owner to employee 
status, is a “contentious, upsetting, and stigmatizing process.” Douglas R. 
Richmond, The Partnership Paradigm and Law Firm Non-equity Partners, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 507, 511-12 (2010); see also Hillman, supra note 58, at 816-17 
(discussing partner “demotions” through de-equitization). While only 44% of 
NLJ 250 firms had a two-tiered partnership structure in 1994, Non-Equity 
Partners, 94-11 PARTNER’S REPORT 14 (Nov. 1994), 70% of firms with more than 
seventy-five attorneys had a two-tiered partnership structure in 2007, 
Partnership Structures, 04-6 PARTNER’S REPORT 8 (June 2004). If those who 
control the firm wish to shed a partner, they can usually do so easily by 
decreasing his or her compensation. 
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were able to reduce the denominator.68 Another strategy 
focused on cutting costs by hiring fewer associates, 
particularly at the entry level, and paying them less;69
requiring longer hours of those who were hired;70 and 
periodically replacing experienced associates with those who 
could do the same work at less cost (and greater profit) to 
the firm.71 They also extended the partnership track.72 Firms 
that previously took pride in inculcating firm-specific 
customs and practices now found the opportunity costs too 
great and increasingly insisted that law schools produce 
“practice-ready” associates.73 Pressures were put on 
associates to become profitable from the beginning, while 
 68. Nat Slavin, Secrets, Lies and Law Firm Profits, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 
1, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 15011633 (suggesting that the “profits-per-
partner game,” which allows firms to recruit top lateral hires, is “a vicious 
circle” that allows firms to get better clients and charge those clients higher 
fees).  
 69. See Joe Palazolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL ST. J., June 
25, 2012 (“Members of the law-school class of 2011 had little better than a 50-50 
shot of landing a job as a lawyer within nine months of receiving a degree . . . .”); 
see also Maulik Shah, The Legal Education Bubble: How Law Schools Should 
Respond to Changes in the Legal Market, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 843, 850 
(2010) (“A small number of firms are . . . instituting an apprenticeship system 
for new associates . . . . [T]he basic idea is that . . . associates will get basic 
training, lower salary, and billed to clients at lower rates.”). 
 70. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 47, at 1877. 
 71. See David Lat, A Peek Inside the Winston & Strawn Black Box and 
Additional Info on Stealth Layoffs, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 23, 2010, 3:42 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/04/a-peek-inside-the-winston-strawn-black-boxand-
additional-info-on-stealth-layoffs (former associate describing “stealth layoffs” at 
one large firm). 
 72. Among 500 recently promoted partners at sixty Am Law firms, the 
average time to partner was ten-and-a-half years. See Sara Randazzo, For This 
Year’s New Partners, Perseverance Pays, AM LAW DAILY (Jan. 13, 2012, 6:53PM), 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/01/for-this-years-new-partners-
perseverance-pays-off.html. 
 73. See David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1 (“So, for decades, clients have essentially 
underwritten the training of new lawyers, paying as much as $300 an hour for 
the time of associates learning on the job. But the downturn in the economy, and 
long-running efforts to rethink legal fees, have prompted more and more of 
those clients to send a simple message to law firms: Teach new hires on your 
own dime.”). 
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lateral hiring also became more attractive. In these 
circumstances, the sharpness of competition within firms 
often came to equal that which existed between firms. 
Loyalty is a luxury for employees and firms alike.74
In the current environment, partnerships are simply 
markets in microcosm. Often the relationship among 
partners is largely competitive and adversarial; the only 
common goal is to maximize this year’s profits. Some 
partners will succeed in the competition; others will not; 
some will believe that they have succeeded, but will feel 
insufficiently rewarded. Partners will come and go, some 
more quickly than others.75 That is an essential part of the 
reimagining of the firm. Indeed, even as the parties repeat 
the wedding vows, both may already be surveying the field. 
The cost incurred in shedding partners is simply a cost of 
doing business. Partnership is a transient status.  
For the most part, these changes went unnoted in the 
law schools, which were mainly interested in law firms as 
sources of funding for themselves and of employment 
opportunities for their students.76 Indeed, many law schools 
 74. See Jonathan Lindsey et al., Lateral Partners: Compensation Is Key to 
Attracting and Retaining Rainmakers, 8 LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP & BENEFITS 
REP. 1, 1 (2002) (“[A]ny lingering stigma associated with switching firms has 
long since vanished.”); Rehnquist, supra note 47, at 152 (noting a decline in 
loyalty among large-firm partners); Saundra Torry & B.H. Lawrence, Star
Lawyers Become ‘Free Agents’; Traditional Loyalty Gives Way to Bidding War 
Mentality, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1989, at A1 (“[T]he best and brightest are all too 
eager to make a switch.”). 
 75. See Henderson & Bierman, supra note 60, at 1403 (“The ‘churn’ of 
partners . . . varies by metropolitan area.”). There is always the possibility that 
today’s ally will become tomorrow’s rival. See Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of 
Partnership Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 398 (1998) 
(“For many firms, present partners represent significant future competitors.”). 
 76. Many law professors were not particularly interested in the profession. 
Some had never practiced law, while others had practiced only for token 
amounts of time. See Segal, supra note 73 (“One 2010 study of hiring at top-tier 
law schools since 2000 found that the median amount of practical experience 
was one year, and that nearly half of faculty members had never practiced law 
for a single day.”). Among other things, a dismal academic job market beginning 
in the late 1960s caused many recent PhDs to go to law school with the objective 
of becoming law professors. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and 
the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 167 
(2006) (“First, American universities produced a glut of Ph.D’s in the 1960s and 
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hoped to share in the law firms’ prosperity in two ways: 
rising associate salaries were thought to justify higher 
tuition, while increased partnership income could translate 
into increasingly robust donations. Thus, while law schools 
seemed to sleep, the legal profession became the legal 
industry. Just as surely, law schools became the legal 
education industry.  
Competition is king in legal education, too. Success or 
failure may turn on the slightest change in the rankings, 
and efforts to influence the rankings have sometimes 
involved levels of deceit that would make most boiler room 
operators blush.77 The pressures placed on deans are 
1970s, and some of these students gravitated to law schools, and eventually to 
the legal academy, bringing their training and interdisciplinary perspectives 
with them.”). The entry of such dual-trained scholars proved a boon for 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship, but it also increased the distance between 
the legal academy and the practicing bar. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like 
A Lawyer, Work Like A Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law 
Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (1991) (arguing that law professors have 
“resolved their dichotomous mission—their role as both teachers of academics 
and trainers of lawyers—by identifying themselves as academicians first and 
foremost”); see also Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against 
Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637, 645 (1968) (“By compelling true academics, or those 
who have the potential for serious scholarship, to play out a Hessian-trainer 
role, and by compelling highly skilled Hessian-trainers to make believe they are 
legal scholars, the disease dilutes both scholarship and Hessian training to the 
advantage of neither.”). See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing 
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV.
34 (1992) (arguing for more “practical” scholarship, with a healthy balance of 
theory and doctrine).  
 77. See, e.g., Chris Mondics, Villanova on 2 Year Probation for Grade-
Inflation Scandal, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 2012 (describing an Association 
of American Law Schools-imposed probation for knowingly reporting inaccurate 
student qualifications); Julie Wurth, Admissions-Scandal Effects Muted So Far,
NEWS-GAZETTE (Illinois), Aug. 26, 2012, at A1 (noting that the law school at The 
University of Illinois was fined and censured by ABA for extensive misreporting 
of student qualifications); Breaking: Ex-CSO Assistant Director from Thomas 
Jefferson Admits to Fraud, Alleges Deliberate Scheme by Law School, LAW SCH.
TRANSPARENCY (Oct. 23, 2012, 10:00AM), http://www.lawschooltransparency. 
com/ 2012/10/ex-cso-assistant-director-from-tjls-admits-to-fraud (highlighting 
Thomas Jefferson Law School’s misreporting of graduates’ employment data); 
see also Christopher Polchin, Raising the “Bar” on Law School Data Reporting: 
Solutions to the Transparency Problem, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 201, 221 (2012) 
(“Students are embarking upon six-digit mounds of debt based on 
[representations of] sunny job prospects that are, in reality, just the opposite.”). 
686 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
intense. Universities have always depended on law schools 
to underwrite less profitable programs. That may have 
made sense when legal education was mainly delivered in 
gigantic lecture halls, with little expensive equipment and 
few auxiliary student services. It also may have made sense 
because law graduates seemed destined to make larger 
salaries than others. But neither condition now holds. Law 
graduates cannot count on dramatically higher-paying jobs, 
and legal education is not the profit center it was.  
Legal education now depends heavily on small-group 
learning, whether in seminars or clinics,78 and it requires 
state-of-the-art information technology.79 Students also 
demand state-of-the art facilities and expect an array of 
student services that was unheard of a generation ago.80 But 
universities still look to law schools for their “tax.”81 The 
price of a legal education has increased dramatically; law 
student debt is high; current employment prospects are 
 78. See, e.g., Suzanne Valdez Carey, An Essay on the Evolution of Clinical 
Legal Education and Its Impact on Student Trial Practice, 51 U. KAN. L. REV.
509, 540-41 (2003) (“Clinical legal education has . . . established itself as a 
critical component of legal education . . . .”). See generally Laura G. Holland, 
Invading the Ivory Tower: The History of Clinical Education at Yale Law School,
49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504 (1999) (chronicling the rise of clinical education at Yale). 
The status of clinical faculty has long been a divisive issue. See generally Peter 
Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of ABA Standards for Clinical Faculty,
75 TENN. L. REV. 183 (2008) (detailing historical development of relevant 
accreditation standards). 
 79. See John A. Sebert, The Cost and Financing of Legal Education, 52 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 516, 524 (2002) (noting that technology, including that necessary 
for administrative functions, has been a major contributor to cost increases). 
 80. See generally Brian Jacob et al., College as Country Club: Do Colleges 
Cater to Students’ Preferences for Consumption?, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 18,745; Sarah Ferris, As Students Become More 
Like Customers, GW Faced with Swelling Demands, GW HATCHET (Aug. 21, 
2013), http://www.gwhatchet.com/2013/08/21/welcome-to-gw-where-students-
come-first. 
 81. According to Frank Read, some universities regularly take up to 30% of 
their law schools’ tuition revenue to support other programs. See Frank T. 
Read, Law School Debt Blues, The Crushing Burden of Debt Dictates Students’ 
Life Choices, 13 TEX. LAW. 19 (1997); see also Childs Walker, University of 
Baltimore President Responds to Ousted Law Dean, BALT. SUN, Aug. 1, 2011 
(resigning Baltimore Law School dean claimed that the university seized 45% of 
the law school’s revenues). 
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bleak.82 Differential pricing frequently places the greatest 
financial burden on those considered to be the least well-
qualified students.83
All are rightly concerned about the high cost of legal 
education and the debt burden that students take on to pay 
that cost. But price seems to have little to do with student 
choice; many students are willing to go deeply into debt to 
acquire a degree from the most highly ranked school to 
which they can secure admission. What matters to students 
is the perceived market value of a particular degree, and 
they depend on the rankings to measure it.84
Law schools know how to capitalize on that fact. For 
example, they turn down well-qualified entry-level students 
whose credentials would jeopardize their rankings, but 
accept many of them as transfers, when their credentials do 
not matter.85 Nonetheless, there is diminished demand for 
legal education. Many law schools must choose between 
lower standards and unfilled seats. Some law schools will 
close. But the declining interest in legal careers will also 
challenge the broader society, which has depended on 
lawyers to fill an array of offices of public trust, from local 
hospital boards to the presidency of the nation.86
Clearly, American legal education is ripe for change, but 
the direction of change is far from certain. Will it be change 
designed to ease the pain associated with the inevitable 
death of the profession as we have known it, or will it be 
 82. See Merritt, supra note 13, at 7 (“NALP’s nine-month employment reports 
are bleak. Even the class of 2007, which enjoyed the strongest placement 
success in recent times, faced a significant job gap.”). 
 83. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 98-102.  
 84. See Bourne, supra note 6, 664 (“The rankings play directly into the 
psychological needs of students and teachers across the board, because they feed 
directly into the almost unconscious worship of hierarchy, however illegitimate, 
that afflicts law students, law teachers, and the legal services industry.”).  
 85. See Hannah R. Arterian, The Hidden Curriculum, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 279, 
289 (2009).  
 86. See generally John E. Cribbet, The Changeless, Ever-Changing 
University: The Role of the Law School, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 241, 256-57 (1984) 
(arguing that law schools should equip their graduates to serve a democratic 
society). 
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change aimed at ensuring once more the persistence of core 
professional values amidst changed circumstances? In any 
event, one might assume that the starting point should be 
to take stock of the aims and purposes of the legal 
profession and the justice system; the ways in which the 
legal profession currently serves or disserves those aims 
and purposes; the ways in which legal education can shape 
and serve those aims and purposes; and, more broadly, the 
relationship of both legal practice and legal education to 
human flourishing, the requirements of justice, and the 
well-being of a democratic society. One might begin by also 
trying to give a full account of the lawyer’s role, both as a 
representative of clients in circumstances too numerous to 
catalogue and as a “public citizen having a special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.”87 By demonstrating 
such openness to wider questions of professional identity 
and education, one could begin to consider how best to 
educate lawyers.88
A good starting point for thinking about the purposes to 
be served by legal education is to focus on the purpose of 
education itself. Philip Jackson, a long-time scholar of 
educational theory and practice, has taken up John Dewey’s 
1938 challenge to educators to “‘find[] out just what 
education is.’”89 In a short but thoughtful book, Jackson 
seeks to build up a theory of education for contemporary 
purposes. At the most basic level, Jackson notes, “education 
was and is and perhaps always will be a socially facilitated 
 87. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble & Scope ¶ 1 (2013). 
 88. Some, indeed, have taken that approach. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN 
ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 12, 146
(2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT] (advocating for an integrated approach to 
legal education that would “combine conceptual knowledge, skill and moral 
discernment” with “the capacity to recognize the ethical questions [that] are 
obscured by other issues” and the ability to exercise “wise judgment when 
values conflict”); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 330-34 (1992) 
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; AM. BAR ASS’N, TEACHING AND LEARNING 
PROFESSIONALISM 13-25 (1996). 
 89. PHILIP W. JACKSON, WHAT IS EDUCATION? 4-5 (2012).  
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process of cultural transmission.”90 Education “involves 
transmitting something that is considered valuable by those 
in charge of the operation.”91 Jackson sees education as 
“‘trafficking in truth,’” and he affirms that “education is 
fundamentally a moral enterprise.”92 Accordingly, Jackson 
posits that the goal of education 
is to effect beneficial changes in humans, not just in what they 
know and can do but, more important, in their character and 
personality, in the kind of persons they become. Moreover, the 
beneficiaries of that process are not just the individuals being 
served but also the society at large. Ultimately, the world in 
general stands to benefit from such an effort.93
Some might regard this description as more appropriate 
to preprofessional education, seeing students as already 
fully formed adults by the time they embark on 
postgraduate studies such as law. Yet, while students may 
increasingly become partners in their own education as they 
become older and more mature, men and women beginning 
the study of law do not usually have a fully formed idea of 
what it means to be a lawyer, and it is up to the law schools 
to see to it that students receive the grounding necessary for 
that development.94 In a sense, that has become more 
difficult in recent years, as fewer full-time law professors 
have had any substantial amount of experience in the 
practice of law.95
 90. Id. at 10. 
 91. Id. at 94. 
 92. Id. at 20, 94.  
 93. Id. at 94. 
 94. See Barry Sullivan & Ellen S. Podgor, Respect, Responsibility, and the 
Virtue of Introspection: An Essay on Professionalism in the Law School 
Environment, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 117, 119 (2001) (arguing 
that law schools must strive to cultivate “a sense of professional self-
consciousness and constructive introspection, and an attitude of respect and 
responsibility towards others”). 
 95. See Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law 
Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of 
Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV.
105, 107-08 (2010) (“The gulf between the main faculty and these second and 
third class members of the legal academy in terms of practical experience and 
690 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
The situation is exacerbated by changes in law practice. 
In earlier times, even relatively brief periods spent in 
practice might have permitted a junior lawyer to gain 
valuable real-world experience in a large firm. That is less 
likely to be the case now, when associates are more likely to 
spend their time assembling documents or reviewing them 
for privilege than closely observing their elders try cases, 
argue appeals, or negotiate transactions, let alone 
participating in those activities themselves. If difficult 
ethical issues arise, and are seriously dealt with, the 
process is not likely to involve the most junior associates. 
On the other hand, of course, law schools have made large 
commitments to clinical education, and many have become 
more open to having courses taught by adjuncts.96 But 
clinics are costly and typically serve relatively few students, 
and adjuncts are necessarily focused on their primary 
employment.
As Jackson has observed, education is at least in part a 
process whereby the community transmits its values to 
those who wish to join it. When lawyers and law schools 
accept the proposition that the legal profession is really the 
legal industry, that professional values are illusory and 
simply a form of deception that masks self-interest and 
facilitates the exaction of monopoly profits, and that clients 
and students are simply customers, it is difficult to imagine 
what kind of “cultural transmission” is meant to be effected 
through legal education, formal or informal. It is equally 
difficult, given those assumptions, to imagine how legal 
education can fulfill its role of effecting beneficial changes 
in individual characters, the society at large, or the world in 
general. If there is no such thing as the legal profession, no 
substance or truth to professional values, and no 
relationship with clients and students other than that 
inclination is widening at the very time when it needs to be shrinking.”); see also 
Edwards, supra note 76, at 34 (“While [law] schools are moving toward pure 
theory, the firms are moving toward pure commerce, and the middle ground—
ethical practice—has been deserted by both.”).  
 96. See Holland, supra note 78, at 504; David A. Lander, Are Adjuncts a 
Benefit or a Detriment?, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 285, 285 (2008) (commenting on 
increasing role of adjuncts in legal education, and asserting that one-quarter of 
all courses are now taught by adjuncts). 
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defined by market values,97 it is no wonder that law schools 
have come to see themselves as being in crisis.  
But much of the current commentary takes a different 
tack: legal education is not “a moral enterprise,” but simply 
the training component of “the legal industry.”98 Neither 
lawyers nor law schools have any identity except as market 
actors; the only goal is to make both more profitable and 
efficient. Thus, one can talk about training lawyers in the 
same way that one talks about building particular machines 
to perform particular functions in other industries. Both the 
articulation of the problem and its analysis reflect the 
crudest versions of economic analysis. Some of the 
discussion involves more than that, of course, but even then 
it is likely to be based on something other than sound and 
prudent reflection.  
To be sure, lawyers are market actors. American 
lawyers have never been indifferent to personal profit or 
well-being; no false sense of propriety ever required that 
American clients slip “honoraria” into the back of a 
barrister’s gown. But American lawyers have always viewed 
themselves as something more than simply market actors. 
What is at stake in the current debate is whether they will 
continue to do so, and, if they do, whether that stance can 
be justified.  
II. 
Two law professors, Thomas D. Morgan and Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, have been particularly influential in setting the 
current terms of the debate. Morgan has written a book 
addressing the challenges presented by globalization; 
Tamanaha has written a book about legal education and its 
current plight.99 Morgan is an expert on professional 
responsibility and a former law school dean. Tamanaha is a 
scholar of jurisprudence who had the unusual experience of 
 97. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 21 (2010) 
(“[L]awyers in American [sic] are not now a profession and—over most of their 
history—they have never been one.”). 
 98. See, e.g., DeSorrento & Thompson, supra note 10, at 577.  
 99. See generally MORGAN, supra note 97; TAMANAHA, supra note 63.
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serving as an interim dean before receiving tenure. Both 
have been government lawyers; neither, apparently, has 
ever been engaged in the full-time private practice of law.  
The starting point for each book is the proposition that 
legal education and legal practice are activities to be defined 
mainly in market terms; they are creatures of the 
marketplace and neither can persist unless its values reflect 
market realities.100 That, according to both writers, is the 
hard truth; there is not much more to say.  
Neither book spends much time on the virtues or values 
(let alone the demands) of a profession charged with 
occupying a public space in a democratic society;101 the 
profession presumably rises or falls along with a cluster of 
factors drawn from market theory and neoliberal attitudes 
about the forces that allegedly motivate human behavior.102
Nor is there much discussion about many of the most 
significant roles that lawyers play: effectively and 
peacefully resolving disputes and conflicts, providing 
effective representation to individuals in a diverse and 
complex society, and protecting individuals and groups 
against the state and powerful private interests.103 Likewise, 
there is little said about the lawyer’s role in educating 
clients; in crafting, planning, negotiating, and 
 100. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 3; TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at x-xi.  
101. See, e.g., Martin Bohmer, Equalizers and Translators: Lawyers’ Ethics in 
a Constitutional Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1363, 1375 (2009) 
(emphasizing lawyers’ roles as “rhetorical equalizers” and “translators from the 
language of private interests to the language of the public interest”); Kenneth 
M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional Responsibility, 19 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 155 (2006) (arguing that law schools must emphasize 
“democracy duty”). See generally Fred C. Zacharias, True Confessions About the 
Role of Lawyers in a Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1591 (2009) (examining 
various perspectives on lawyers in a democracy). 
 102. See Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1383, 1387 (2009) (arguing that democratic lawyering 
challenges neoliberalism and its agenda). 
 103. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report 
of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159-62 (1958) (finding that the 
lawyer delivers “special services,” and that “the lawyer must keep his 
obligations of public service distinct from the involvements of his private 
practice”).
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memorializing transactions; or in problem-solving for 
families, businesses, agencies, and bureaucracies. But 
grand plans are unveiled for training “legal workers” in 
ways that reflect the authors’ views of new developments in 
the profession and society and the desirability or need for a 
more stratified profession.104
What these books tell us, albeit in different ways, is 
that an appropriate legal education for most lawyers is one 
that can be completed in the shortest time and at the lowest 
cost. This is true, the books tell us, even though practicing 
lawyers face an increasingly complex world. In addition, the 
legal profession that deserves our attention seems pared 
down to those who serve the interests of the biggest 
businesses; scant attention is paid to that part of the 
profession that does not. The latter can make do with a 
lesser legal education and look forward to less success in the 
marketplace. Where judges or criminal defense lawyers will 
come from, and how lawyers who serve the middle class and 
the poor will fit into this vision, is not clear. How bright 
students from underprivileged backgrounds or those with 
other deficits of social capital will fare in this new regime 
also remains unclear. Nor is it clear how the public’s 
business will be done. All that matters is that the market 
will have taken a full measure of everyone’s worth—by 
whatever criteria the market finds compelling at the 
moment.
A.
In The Vanishing American Lawyer, Thomas D. Morgan 
takes stock of the challenges that lawyers face; he provides 
many insightful observations about changes that already 
have occurred in the market for legal services and about 
further changes that he deems necessary. Indeed, the great 
strength of Morgan’s work is his enthusiasm for the future 
and his willingness to imagine precisely what the future 
may hold. One of Morgan’s central points is that “lawyers 
are facing fundamental changes in both what they will be 
 104. See MORGAN, supra note 97, at 167-82; TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 207-
16.
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asked to do and whether the work they once did will 
continue to be done by lawyers at all.”105 Morgan has less 
enthusiasm for giving the past its due. He notes, for 
example, that we should no longer look to experience for 
wisdom because the world changes too quickly for even our 
own experiences to provide useful guidance: “As we grow 
older, we expect that experience will allow us to know more 
and to do familiar things better. In an era of change such as 
ours, however, experience can become a burden.”106
Morgan argues that “the concept of a lawyer we have 
known will become a part of history, along with the knights 
and mercenaries who were hired to fight the battles of 
others in earlier times.”107 He believes the term “lawyer,” if 
it is used at all, “will increasingly be seen as imprecise and 
obsolete,” and it “will come to describe a very different kind 
of occupation.”108 Society may need law, Morgan suggests, 
but “it does not follow that a system based on law requires 
lawyers, as we now know them, to run effectively.”109 “For 
better or worse, most of tomorrow’s lawyers will resemble 
what we today call business consultants more than they will 
call to mind Clarence Darrow and Atticus Finch.”110
Even more fundamental, perhaps, is Morgan’s 
argument that there is no such thing as the “legal 
profession,” at least in the traditional sense of a group 
having a common identity and culture.111 For Morgan, the 
so-called “legal profession” is simply a collection of 
individuals who share a common training, but use it for 
diverse purposes and in ways that are more different than 
 105. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 3.  
 106. Id. at 72. 
 107. Id. at 16. One might be forgiven for wondering about the basis for 
Morgan’s assertion that the age of mercenaries is over, whether the term is 
taken literally or figuratively. 
108. Id. at 25.  
 109. Id. at 26. This sentiment seems somewhat analogous to the idea that 
society needs “spirituality” but not organized religion.
 110. Id. at 25. 
 111. Id. at 21.  
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alike.112 In addition, lawyers can no longer be seen primarily 
as advocates or legal counselors; they are simply “business 
consultants” with special training in law.113 For that reason, 
recent developments in legal education, which seek to 
improve the competence of all students in certain skills, do 
not comport with contemporary legal practice.114 Indeed, 
Morgan believes that much of what law students are 
required to learn in law school will not be of any practical 
use to them.115 According to Morgan, legal education is 
headed in exactly the wrong direction.116
In Morgan’s view, the “fact” that there is no such thing 
as a legal profession must be understood if legal work is to 
be liberated from its professional pretensions and put on a 
sound business basis: “[U]se of the idea of a ‘profession’ to 
understand the world of lawyers [simply] obstructs clear 
thinking about what lawyers actually do and how they are 
likely to have to respond to the world they face.”117 Morgan 
concedes that professionalism might have been a 
meaningful concept in prior ages, when lay people could not 
understand law or independently evaluate the work of 
lawyers, although the term is meaningless today, when 
 112. Id. at 25-26. This is an argument that has been made frequently in recent 
years to support an exemption from certain rules of professional responsibility 
for multinational firms and others that deal with “sophisticated” clients. For 
example, it has been argued that such firms must be allowed to engage in 
multidisciplinary practices, raise capital through the selling of shares to 
nonlawyer investors, and be relieved from such ethical restraints as the so-
called “hot potato” doctrine. See Daniel J. Bussel, No Conflict, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 207, 222-23 (2012); Sara J. Lewis, Note, Charting the “Middle” Way: 
Liberalizing Multijurisdictional Practice Rules for Lawyers Representing 
Sophisticated Clients, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631, 659-60 (2009); The Case 
Against Clones, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2013, at 51, 51. Otherwise, it has been 
argued, such firms will be disadvantaged in the marketplace, both with respect 
to other professional services firms that provide some form of legal counsel and 
foreign law firms, many of which operate free from such constraints. See Lewis, 
supra, at 639. 
 113. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 25.  
 114. See id. at 15.  
 115. See id. at 15-16.  
 116. See id. at 200-04. 
 117. Id. at 20.  
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“many clients . . . are able to—and do—evaluate and direct 
their lawyers.”118
Although there is much to be said for Morgan’s detailed 
analysis and insights, his area of genuine concern seems 
curiously limited to the lawyers who practice in firms that 
serve big business, particularly international business. 
Indeed, what seems to concern him most is creating the 
necessary conditions for such firms to “achieve . . . 
“dominan[ce].”119 He seems far less concerned about other 
aspects and concerns of the legal sphere, such as the quality 
and effectiveness of the courts, the successful prosecution of 
crimes, the peaceful and satisfactory resolution of disputes, 
or the ability of ordinary people to enforce their rights. 
Amidst the package of educational reforms that he offers, he 
seems scarcely to have considered, for example, how judges 
will be prepared for the work that they must do in the new 
environment that he envisions. He admits that the smaller 
and more specialized bar he envisions might give “reason 
for concern that it will be harder to find judges who are 
qualified to manage the work of a court of general 
jurisdiction,”120 but he points out that the problem is not 
 118. Id. at 25. That is true, but only with respect to the most sophisticated 
clients represented by the large firms, and the extent that it is true even of 
them is open to question. Certainly, some corporate counsel will overrule the 
litigation decisions of outside counsel, but often they do so on questionable 
grounds. For example, it is not uncommon for corporate counsel to insist that 
particular arguments be made to a court because they think that their corporate 
superiors would wish to have those arguments made, even though litigation 
counsel rightly believes that the arguments will adversely affect the client’s 
case. Morgan is admirably clear in telling us that that legal practice cannot, in 
his view, be categorized as a “profession.” Id. at 21. He is less clear, however, in 
telling us whether any activity should be so denominated. At one point, he 
seems to concede that medicine properly can be considered a unitary profession, 
but he also seems to suggest that the word itself is suspect, unless it is given the 
thinnest possible meaning: that is, expert work for which people are willing to 
pay money. See id. at 15-17. Morgan perceptively notes that contemporary 
society has come to use the word “profession” almost “promiscuously.” Id. at 21. 
This is an interesting point because, just as the word “profession” has been 
applied to every conceivable line of work, the word “industry” also has become 
ubiquitous. 
 119. Id. at 166.  
 120. Id. at 229. 
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really a difficult one because most courts are specialized or 
require more by way of “empathy and common sense” than 
of legal knowledge.121 Presumably, those with much at stake 
would simply opt out of the public justice system and have 
their disputes settled by highly paid private adjudicators. 
But Morgan also speculates that judicial candidates who 
require broader knowledge would probably be willing to go 
back to school.122 Morgan does not explore the consequences 
that might flow from such a radically different approach to 
staffing the judicial branch, let alone how such changes 
might affect the role or status of judges in society.123
Likewise, Morgan gives little attention to the 
importance of educating criminal defense lawyers and 
prosecutors who can provide effective representation;124 he 
does not address the challenges presented by living in a 
nation that is both beset by crime and hobbled by a criminal 
justice system that comes perilously close to not working at 
all. No one seriously believes that most persons accused of a 
crime receive the kind of representation to which they are 
 121. Id. Not everyone possesses common sense or empathy. Having mentioned 
the importance of these qualities in staffing his inferior tribunals, Morgan does 
not explain how persons with these qualities will be recruited. In addition, such 
qualities, while desirable in adjudicators at all levels, should not be seen as a 
substitute for legal knowledge. Decisions based entirely on common sense or 
empathy do not conform to the minimum requirements of the rule of law. 
 122. Id. at 230. 
 123. In common law countries, the appointing authorities have tended to 
choose experienced practitioners and senior academic lawyers as judges. See
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 34 (3d 
ed. 2007). This fact has contributed to the relatively high prestige of the bench 
in those countries. Id. In civil law countries, by contrast, judges traditionally 
have been career civil servants and enjoy varying degrees of independence, 
public confidence, and professional respect. See id. at 35 . Studies of the post-
Communist judiciary in Russia suggest that the maintenance of a high-quality, 
respected, and independent judiciary is not something that can be taken for 
granted. See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY IN RUSSIA:
REPORT OF THE ICJ RESEARCH MISSION ON JUDICIAL REFORM TO THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 14 (2010), available at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/Russia-indepjudiciary-report-2010.pdf (noting that 
court clerks, researchers, police officers, and prosecutors are appointed as 
judges, but lawyers are not). 
 124. See MORGAN, supra note 97, at 218-20.  
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entitled under the Constitution, and the pressures placed on 
defendants to engage in plea bargaining, rather than avail 
themselves of their constitutional right to a jury trial, are 
intense. Clearly, the system could not work if the rights of 
criminal defendants were treated as something more than 
“paper rights.”125 It is as if Morgan thinks such matters, 
which have long been considered core concerns of any legal 
system, will somehow take care of themselves. 
Of course, Morgan is not particularly interested in the 
full spectrum of lawyers and lawyers’ work. He is mainly 
concerned with “elite lawyers”—those who can afford an 
elite education and will spend their careers working for elite 
clients, either in elite law firms or at corporate 
headquarters.126 Although they are now to be viewed, in 
Morgan’s terms, as a specialized cohort of “business 
consultants,” rather than as traditional “lawyers,” they 
represent the part of the world of “legal work” that is of 
principal interest to him. Those lawyers who cannot afford 
an elite education and do not make their careers working 
for elite clients are not “real” lawyers, or, at least, not the 
real focus of Morgan’s concern. They may be judges, 
government regulatory lawyers, criminal defense lawyers, 
prosecutors, or advocates and counselors for small 
businesses, the middle class, or the poor, but the work that 
they do is, by definition, “routine.”127
 125. For example, Justice Jackson spoke eloquently on the indispensability of 
the lawyer’s role in giving value to the “paper ‘rights’” of citizenship. See Robert 
H. Jackson, Tribute to Country Lawyers: A Review, 30 A.B.A. J. 136, 138 (1944). 
 126. See MORGAN, supra note 97, at 128-75. 
 127. See id. at 132-33. An important part of the story of private practice will be 
missed if one overlooks the sector of midsized firms. Midsized firms may be able 
to provide their juniors with more meaningful professional experiences than 
large firms, freeing them to engage in public service activities of their own 
choosing, rather than being assigned to represent the pet cause of a powerful 
partner in another office. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 65, at 70 
(“[D]iseconomies of scale—such as multiplying conflicts of interest and the 
friction inherent in management, coordination, and splitting the pie according to 
each individual’s marginal contribution among increasingly unfamiliar 
colleagues—should make growth beyond a certain scale affirmatively 
unprofitable.”); see also Jeff Coburn, Making it Without Merging: Who Says 
Midsized Firms Can’t Surge Ahead While Staying Independent?, OF COUNSEL,
June 2006, at 5, 7 (describing how the midsized firm Patterson, Belknap, Webb 
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Morgan apparently considers the difficulty and interest 
of most legal work to be proportional to the amount of 
money at stake, but he recognizes that there are exceptions 
to that generalization, as where an individual finds himself 
enmeshed in litigation.128 Of course, much of the most 
difficult legal work does involve large sums of money, as we 
know from the derivatives fiasco.129 Indeed, much 
complicated legal work was involved in creating investment 
vehicles that even the creators did not fully understand.130
However, when one contemplates the complexity of ordinary 
modern life—or attempts to work through invoices from a 
health care provider or cell phone company—one must 
wonder whether the generalization is correct. In any event, 
according to Morgan, non-elite lawyers constitute a separate 
work force that does not need the kind of education required 
of the elite “business consultants,” and they should not 
aspire to the same professional, social, or economic rewards 
as the “business consultants.”131
As Morgan sees it, the elite sector is destined to become 
only more elite and more globally oriented, whereas the 
non-elite sector will be transformed or will wither away, 
with its members eventually being replaced simply by 
standardized legal forms and narrowly specialized, less 
well-educated, less well-paid, and lower-status workers 
trained to fill out the forms.132 But disputes are not always 
& Tyler experienced 100% attorney participation in pro bono activities within a 
two-year span). 
 128. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 133. 
 129. See generally SATYAJIT DAS, TRADERS, GUNS & MONEY: KNOWNS AND 
UNKNOWNS IN THE DAZZLING WORLD OF DERIVATIVES (rev. ed. 2010) (exposing the 
culture of greed surrounding derivatives trading); NICHOLAS DUNBAR, THE 
DEVIL’S DERIVATIVES: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE SLICK TRADERS AND HAPLESS 
REGULATORS WHO ALMOST BLEW UP WALL STREET . . . AND ARE READY TO DO IT
AGAIN (2011) (describing the rise of derivatives trading and the personalities of 
its wealthiest champions). 
 130. See Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century 
Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 15-30 (2011) (defining derivatives and 
their characteristics and presenting a modern framework for understanding 
them). 
 131. See MORGAN, supra note 97, at 25, 213-26.  
 132. See id. at 95, 130.  
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between non-elite clients or between elite clients. 
Sometimes disputes occur when the interests of a non-elite 
client collide with those of an elite client, and there is not 
much doubt about whose interest will prevail in such a 
case.133 The narrowly specialized and less well-educated 
lawyer often will prove no match for the high-priced lawyer 
representing the credit card company. 
To be sure, the Great Recession and the downturn in 
demand for higher-end legal services that preceded it do 
seem to have been particularly hard on the elite sector.134
Even those who were not part of the control groups that 
governed or managed their firms had become accustomed to 
lavish lifestyles fueled by robust levels of compensation.135
The downturn in firm profits resulting from the decline in 
demand for legal services saw various responses, beginning 
with the large-scale cutting loose of relatively lower-paid 
employees.136 Ultimately, however, many highly 
compensated partners had to be turned out so that the 
compensation levels of those who stayed could remain at a 
level commensurate with their expectations.137 Those who 
were deemed expendable certainly were worse off than their 
forebears of the so-called “‘golden age,’” when large-firm 
lawyers not only thought of themselves as the “conscience” 
of their clients but also had a sense of belonging to a 
common enterprise that included the assurance that 
“‘nobody starves,’”138 meaning that lawyers were not made 
 133. See Galanter, supra note 46, at 103-04. 
 134. See Wald, supra note 50, at 2061 (examining “the changing professional 
landscape of large law firms” in light of the great recession).  
 135. How Much Do Law Firms Pay New Associates? A 14-Year Retrospective as 
Reported by Firms, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LEGAL CAREER PROFS. (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.nalp.org/2009septnewassocsalaries (showing that in 2009 the 
median starting salary for first-year associates at law firms with more than 251 
attorneys was $145,000). 
 136. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Firm Layoffs Hit 10K Mark; Thursdays 
Most Often Bring Bad News, A.B.A. J. L. NEWS NOW (Apr. 13, 2009, 11:45 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_firm_layoffs_hit_10k_mark_thursd
ays_most_often_bring_bad_news.  
 137. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 107. 
 138. Id. at 14 (citing REGAN, supra note 60, at 26 (quoting PAUL C. HOFFMAN,
LIONS IN THE STREET 2 (1973))).  
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redundant when business in their specialty areas suffered a 
downturn and their particular skills were not currently in 
high demand.139
Those who stayed also found life hard. There was less 
demand for the incomprehensible investment vehicles and 
credit agreements that lawyers had made so much money 
designing, lobbying for, and defending in litigation. There 
was little money to be made on litigation when plaintiffs 
lacked the resources to fund it and defendants lacked the 
funds to satisfy any sizeable judgment. There was little 
corporate reorganization work to be done because 
reorganizations require risk capital, and risk capital was in 
short supply. And there are limits to how many hours a 
team of lawyers can work—especially when the work force 
is being reduced—even if the work is available.  
Without any apparent sense of irony, Morgan reports 
that “[l]aw firm partners have tried to keep their own 
earnings steady, but as the chair of one firm put it, We can’t 
beat the donkeys any harder.”140 The donkeys to be beaten, 
of course, are the firm’s employees: the equity partners who 
are not part of the control group, the so-called nonequity 
partners, counsel, the permanent associates, the traditional 
associates, the paralegals, and the support staff.141 If only 
 139. See id. As Morgan correctly points out, the so-called “golden age” was 
hardly a golden age for everyone. Id. at 12. Whereas large-firm employment 
provided much more security than it does today, there was a great deal of racial, 
religious, ethnic, and gender discrimination in the hiring practices of large law 
firms. Id. Social connections and nepotism also provided the basis for 
affirmative discrimination. See generally Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the 
Wasp and Jewish Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1803 (2008). Clients suffered a 
lack of competition as bar associations set and enforced standard, mandatory 
fees for routine services. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 13. 
 140. Morgan, supra note 97, at 3 (quoting David Bario, Fog Advisory: 
Managing Partners Are Nervous About What 2008 Will Bring, AM. LAW., Dec. 
2007, at 112, 114) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 141. Morgan briefly discusses the issue of leverage, see id. at 107, but there is 
more to be said on the subject. First, leverage is not purely a matter of partner-
to-associate ratio, with all partners sharing equally in the profits that leverage 
brings to the firm. Some partners have a greater share in the firm than others 
and therefore benefit from leverage disproportionately. Second, there may be 
partners in a firm, including equity partners, who are valued largely for their 
skills, rather than their business-getting abilities, and who may in fact receive 
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the donkeys could each find a few more hours to bill, life 
would be much more pleasant for everyone, but especially 
for those at the top of the pyramid. Morgan notes that large-
firm lawyers, despite their generally high levels of 
compensation, appear to be less satisfied with their careers 
than other lawyers,142 but he does not stop to reflect on the 
possible connection between job satisfaction and the 
attitude expressed by the firm chair he quoted. Nor does he 
stop to reflect on what kind of an organization it is whose 
leaders think of their partners and other colleagues as 
donkeys.143
less compensation than even the dollar value of their own work would warrant. 
They may sometimes be equity partners, rather than nonequity partners, for 
various reasons. For example, it may be important to the firm that such 
partners contribute capital, which would not be the case if they were nonequity 
partners. That is why some firms initially de-equitized a number of partners 
and later re-equitized them. Finally, de-equitization is often a political matter, 
rather than a financial one. While firms have become less democratic in recent 
years, there are still some political rights that individual partners have. De-
equitization may be used to silence dissenters when other means, such as 
cutting compensation, have failed. On the other side of the ledger, of course, is 
the market for lateral partners who are valued for their “books of business,” 
which sometimes travel, but sometimes do not. Morgan is certainly correct in 
noting that the most “relevant tournament for many lawyers [is the tournament 
which results in the lawyer’s becoming] a partner at a firm that pays more than 
[his] own.” Id. at 110. Of course, the tournament does not end there. At the very 
least, the new partner must strive to ensure that he continues to receive the 
compensation level that brought him there. Moreover, in many cases, the 
partner wandering in search of higher compensation may not be satisfied with 
one upward move. For some partners able to do so, the search for higher 
compensation may resemble the perpetual news cycle or the perpetual election 
cycle. No sooner is he ensconced in his new firm but that the itinerant partner 
begins his search for a potentially more lucrative affiliation. This is not a 
practice limited to large firm lawyers, of course, but one shared by those who 
are restless “stars” in all lines of work. 
 142. Id. at 11 n.36. 
 143. Morgan’s recounting of this story is particularly ironic, given his 
assertions that “firm culture is [more] likely to affect individual lawyer 
behavior” than any ethical prescriptions by bar associations, and that “differing 
firm cultures can constructively compete for the kind of reputation to which they 
will aspire.” Id. at 68. Among large firms, however, there seems to be much less 
variation in “firm culture” in any deep or meaningful sense today than there 
was a generation ago. To the extent that differences are trumpeted, they seem 
to reflect very small differences of emphasis and may be more the product of law 
firms’ marketing departments than reality. At bottom, large firms are all 
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Morgan’s critique cuts quite deep. In his view, the 
contemporary notion of the “legal profession” is simply a 
product of ideas that surfaced in the 1950s and gained 
renewed currency in the 1980s.144 Since then, Morgan 
argues, the notion has been perpetuated by lawyers “in an 
effort to achieve political influence and economic 
advancement.”145 In other words, the notion of legal 
professionalism is a tin horn. While Morgan concedes that 
“many elements of professionalism represent personal 
qualities or styles of behavior that appropriately appeal to 
lawyers’ aspirations to live good lives and act in ways that 
serve the public interest,” he believes that “lawyers have no 
unique claim to these values” and should not be viewed as 
“a special class of service providers.”146 In Morgan’s view, 
the idea that a lawyer is “an officer of the legal system and 
a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality 
of justice”147 is little more than self-serving rhetoric. Nor is 
subject to the same market pressures (or understand themselves to be), as 
Morgan notes, and, by and large, they have responded to those pressures in 
substantially the same ways. See id. at 87. Nor is it clear what Morgan means 
when he speaks of reputation as a vehicle of competition. See id. at 68. Is it 
competition for lawyers or competition for clients? The two arenas are quite 
different. Morgan seems to suggest elsewhere that firms can attract the lawyers 
they want by differentiating themselves through firm culture, that is, by 
showing a receptivity to part-time work, and so forth, see id. at 150 n.52, but 
current market conditions make it unlikely that law firms will do much that 
they otherwise do not find in their economic interest to do, simply to attract new 
lawyers, when the supply so exceeds the demand. Moreover, the reality of what 
firms deliver is often quite different from what they promise. Women regularly 
find that their careers are indeed compromised by taking advantage of 
maternity policies, whatever they are told, and they often find that part-time 
work translates into part-time pay for virtually full-time work. See Joan 
Williams and Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Balanced Hours: Effective Part-Time 
Policies for Washington Law Firms: The Project for Attorney Retention, 8 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 357, 378 (2002). 
 144. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 51, 55.  
 145. Id. at 55. 
 146. Id. at 56. 
 147. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble & Scope ¶ 1 (2013). The idea 
that professional ethics is a superfluous category, and that lawyers simply need 
to follow ordinary ethical rules, is a powerful one. Moreover, lawyers have often 
acted in ways that are morally reprehensible by any standard, and the 
substance of some rules is certainly open to question. But the events of recent 
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there anything to be said, apparently, for the idea that 
affirming these values in a collective and definitive way 
may be valuable in itself, let alone serve to influence the 
affairs of real life in a positive way that transcends merely 
individual “aspirations to live good lives.” “[T]he 
overarching reality today is that lawyers are not set apart 
and special,” Morgan asserts, but simply “economic actors, 
specially trained, but driven by all the vices—and virtues—
of a capitalist economic system.”148 And that, presumably, is 
how it should—and must—be.149
Morgan believes that legal practice is a highly 
differentiated world in which various practitioners who 
might be called “law workers” do very different kinds of 
work and have very little in common. Perhaps the only 
thing they have in common is their helplessness in the face 
of market forces. As with pharmacists and physicians, 
whose working conditions also are less pleasant, and whose 
work is also less intellectually interesting than a generation 
ago,150 “[d]evelopments in the world of lawyers will . . . be 
driven by the world lawyers and their clients face, not the 
world lawyers wish they could create.”151 Moreover, “[t]he 
reality of the differences among lawyers is only increasing 
years suggest that reliance on individual interpretation of the general moral 
standards of the community may not be sufficient to promote the public values 
that warrant protection and encouragement. 
 148. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 25.  
 149. Morgan notes that the “tournament of lawyers” has become the 
“tournament of professionals,” at least insofar as lawyers now compete with 
other vocational groups with overlapping specialized knowledge, such as 
accountants, and with lawyers from other countries. See id. at 59-60, 108; see
also Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1397, 1398 (2006) (noting the various forms of consulting by lawyers and 
nonlawyers). 
 150. Morgan correctly notes that many pharmacists, once trusted professionals 
who ran their own pharmacies and dispensed professional advice personally to 
customers, are now “reduced to dispensing pills from the corner of a local 
Walmart and advising customers only by handing out printed warnings about 
the side-effects of prescription drugs.” MORGAN, supra note 97, at 15. A similar 
narrative may be told about physicians, who “seem to deal with insurance 
companies as much as with patients, and opportunities for independent 
professional judgment are much too rare.” Id. at 16. 
 151. Id.
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today, and . . . the idea of an identity that lawyers have in 
common [is] vanishing rapidly.”152 Morgan also predicts that 
this differentiation will become more acute in the future: 
“[L]awyers are facing fundamental changes in both what 
they will be asked to do and whether the work they once did 
will continue to be done by lawyers at all.”153 Clients seek 
advice from lawyers to help them accomplish an objective; 
they do not generally consult a lawyer simply for 
confirmation that their objective cannot legally be 
accomplished.154 Indeed, most clients, according to Morgan, 
have little interest in whether the transaction conforms to 
law or not; they have no interest in the rule of law; all that 
interests them is getting the result they want in the short 
term.155 And lawyers are less helpful to them than they 
might otherwise be, not only because they take law more 
seriously than their clients do, but because they are trained, 
according to Morgan, to see difficulties rather than 
 152. Id. at 5-6.  
 153. Id. at 3.  
 154. Id. at 61. The implication of much discussion on this point is that lawyers 
are trained to see legal difficulties—rather than possibilities—in any scheme 
presented to them. That may be true to some extent, but market forces certainly 
provide a strong corrective. In the current climate, the more serious danger, for 
both clients and society at large, seems to come from the opposite direction, 
namely, the tendency, in Marshall Field’s immortal words, to “[g]ive the lady 
what she wants[.]” See LLOYD WENDT & HERMAN KOGAN, GIVE THE LADY WHAT 
SHE WANTS! THE STORY OF MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY 223 (1952). What may 
be effective merchandising is not necessarily ethical, socially responsible, or 
even effective lawyering. It is difficult to imagine that anyone who has 
witnessed the events of the past decade in America would think that the 
problems we face are due to lawyers not being sufficiently responsive to their 
clients’ interests. Whether one focuses on the Department of Justice lawyers 
who drafted the torture memos or the lawyers who helped bring down the 
economy by designing exotic investment vehicles or facilitating the granting of 
mortgages to those who could not afford them, the problem does not seem to 
have been the unresponsiveness of lawyers to their masters. It seems utopian to 
believe, in this environment, that “[a] lawyer’s and law firm’s reputation 
increasingly will be the guarantors of professional quality assistance clients 
hope to receive, and private actions against lawyers who fail to meet the 
promised standard are likely to replace formal discipline as the principal 
regulator of lawyer activity.” Morgan, supra note 97, at 231. 
 155. Morgan, supra note 97, at 61.  
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opportunities.156 Presumably, the world belongs to experts 
whose judgment is not clouded by a fastidiousness about 
following the law. 
Much of Morgan’s book correctly emphasizes the 
necessity and inevitability of change. But Morgan’s 
arguments sometimes seem to reflect an odd view of the 
work that lawyers do and have always done. For example, 
Morgan seems to assume that practitioners in the past 
made their living by giving legal advice in vitro, that is, that 
the advice they gave was abstract and rendered without any 
deep appreciation of context, let alone an understanding 
that the client’s goal was to solve a real-life problem, rather 
than some purely legal puzzle or proof. In the future, 
Morgan predicts, “the interaction of law with increasingly 
complex economic and social issues will make distinctively 
legal questions less common and [will] make many of the 
skills honed in law schools less relevant.”157 “Rather than 
needing professionals whose understanding of law dwarfs 
their understanding of the substantive issues faced by 
clients, the world will require legally-trained persons to be 
more fully integrated into the substantive challenges 
today’s clients face.”158 What Morgan says is clearly correct, 
but most experienced practitioners would not find it new.159
If by a “distinctively” legal problem Morgan means to 
describe a “purely” legal problem, it is difficult to imagine 
that such questions ever existed, at least outside the four 
walls of a law school classroom. What Morgan describes as 
the world of the future is what the successful practice of law 
has always entailed. The trusted business lawyer was one 
who had a strong understanding of law, but he was trusted 
mainly because he also understood the real world. He 
understood the context of his client’s business and the 
particular challenges that his client faced; his advice was 
valuable because it was practical and rooted in his 
 156. See id. at 59-61. 
 157. Id. at 15.  
 158. Id.
 159. In this sense, “experience” may not be quite the burden that Morgan 
thinks it to be. See id. at 72. 
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understanding of business as well as law. The trusted 
admiralty lawyer knew about the sea and ships and often 
had been to sea himself. The trusted securities lawyer knew 
as much about the folkways and byways of the securities 
markets as she did about the relevant law. The trusted 
intellectual property lawyer understood science and 
engineering. The trusted university lawyer was trusted 
because she understood the ways of her university client in 
particular as well as those of universities in general. The 
trusted family lawyer was one who could call on an 
understanding of psychology and accounting, and, 
sometimes, the art of persuading the police and the 
judiciary to take emergency actions they might be reluctant 
to take, but which were necessary to preserve the interests, 
and even the life or physical safety of her client.  
Wise counselors were never prized simply because they 
had the kind of intellectual ability that translates into 
membership on the law review; their advice was prized 
because they were wise men and women who knew the 
relevant law, but mostly because they understood the 
nature of their clients’ businesses and experiences. As 
Morgan says, lawyers who cannot provide nonlegal insights 
will find that their phone stops ringing,160 but that has 
always been the case. Karl Llewellyn made the point many 
years ago, as Morgan notes: the successful lawyer must 
“‘know[] . . . the life of the community, the needs and 
practices of his client[,] . . . the working situation which he 
is called upon to shape as well as the law with reference to 
which he is called upon to shape it.’”161
Of course the world changes, and there may be new 
areas of expertise that will be necessary for the successful 
practice of law in the future. The American business lawyer 
working in Japan undoubtedly will provide more effective 
representation to her American client if she has as good a 
grasp of the Japanese language as she has of Japanese 
commercial and competition law. She will be more effective 
 160. See id. at 134.  
 161. Id. at 184 (quoting KARL E. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW
AND ITS STUDY 16 (1960)).
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still if she has a good knowledge of Japanese culture and 
business practice in addition to a sound knowledge of U.S. 
law and the realities of her client’s business. To provide that 
kind of representation, she will probably need the 
assistance of others, but she certainly must know enough to 
act appropriately and in accordance with local commercial 
and social practice, to ask the right questions, and to listen 
to the answers in an informed way. Perhaps even more 
important, the small-town lawyer in western Virginia or 
western Ohio may face the same challenges. She may well 
have a client who needs to do business in China. She cannot 
hope to know enough to represent the client by herself, but 
she risks losing the client altogether if she does not know 
enough to guide him, with help from others, through the 
maze of problems he faces. She is not likely to be effective in 
representing her small-town manufacturer client who 
trades in China if she has only the “routine” “small-town 
lawyer” education that Morgan seemingly thinks adequate 
for her.  
The so-called “hemispheres”162 of legal practice do not 
work in quite the way that Morgan’s model suggests. Small-
town lawyers sometimes need to know something about 
foreign law, and at least one graduate of the William 
Mitchell College of Law has become Chief Justice of the 
United States.163 Neither of those facts is to be regretted. 
Both should be applauded as emblematic of the kind of 
dynamic and egalitarian profession that is one important 
mark of a democratic society. 
What particularly interests Morgan, however, is large-
scale, transnational lawyering, whether done in-house or at 
a large law firm. Indeed, the bulk of the book is devoted to 
that part of the legal sector, its particular problems, and the 
steps it must take to “achieve . . . dominan[ce]” in the new 
global environment.164 For Morgan, that is where the action 
(and the money) is; it is also the area that he regards as 
 162. Id. at 110-11.  
 163. See Donn McLellan, In Memoriam: A Tribute to Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger: Biographical Profile, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 3, 3-4 (1996). 
 164. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 166.  
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least congenial to the traditional values of lawyering and 
professionalism.  
Morgan’s view of legal education builds upon his view of 
practice. There are several objections to it. First, Morgan’s 
view of legal education is convincing only if one truly 
believes that lawyers have no special obligations to the 
public. In a society built on the rule of law, but often 
ignorant of the most basic principles of democratic 
government, denying that lawyers have a special 
responsibility seems an extravagance. Second, Morgan’s 
view assumes that a narrowly specialized education best 
serves the student’s—and the client’s—interest, but, as 
Morgan also recognizes, lawyers with a broader perspective 
are likely to be more successful.165 Among other things, 
lawyers regularly draw on analogies from other areas of 
law. The fewer areas of law one knows anything about, the 
less one has to draw on. Third, a narrowly specialized legal 
education might make sense if students went to law school 
knowing that they wanted to specialize in a particular area 
and could be assured that jobs in that area would exist both 
when they entered the legal workforce and for the longer 
term.166 Unfortunately, most students do not go to law 
school with a firm intention to follow a particular 
subspecialty, and those who do are very likely to change 
their minds, either before graduation or after they have had 
some taste of that subspecialty in practice.167 Furthermore, 
 165. See id. at 208-10. 
 166. See Career Center: Practice Area Survey Results, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 7, 
2010, 12:02 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010104/career-center-practice-area-
survey-results (“Almost half of law student respondents [to a survey asking 
about how the economy has affected practice area choices] indicated that their 
practice area choices have been affected by market conditions, with litigation 
the new top choice among law students.”). 
 167. See Richard L. Abel, Choosing, Nurturing, Training and Placing Public 
Interest Law Students, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1567 (2002) (noting that many 
who enter law school hoping to serve the public interest end up switching to 
more lucrative specialties); see also Changing Practice Areas, FINDLAW,
http://www.infirmation.com/articles/one-article.tcl?article_id=2506 (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2014) (“In a lot of respects, the path attorneys take to joining a 
particular practice area is nothing short of insane. Most attorneys interview for 
summer associate jobs, take the best summer job they can get, and join a 
particular firm without much thought to what practice area they will be in.”).  
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it is extremely difficult to predict that jobs in a particular 
subspecialty will be available.168
Perhaps most important, however, are the advantages 
that such a system creates for those who are already 
advantaged, together with the disadvantages that it 
perpetuates for those who come from more modest 
circumstances. Students who lack social capital are not 
likely to begin their studies with the kind of backgrounds 
that will ensure them a fast start in legal study, let alone 
with a knowledge of the world of law and business that 
allows them to come to legal study knowing what kind of 
legal work they want to do when they have secured their 
education. If there are such students who know precisely 
what they want to do when they complete their studies, 
they probably are the children of lawyers and business 
people and others who, because of their backgrounds, have 
already seen a fair slice of the world of business and 
commerce. In the past, however, many successful business 
lawyers have come from modest beginnings and have known 
very little of the world of business when they began their 
studies.169 It was the breadth of the law school curriculum 
and the opportunity to learn about many different subjects 
from many different professors that put them on paths that 
they would not otherwise have known to exist.170
168. “[The] original practice area interest of [selected law school respondents] 
was 46% corporate, 23% litigation, 18% real estate, 4% bankruptcy, 3% 
employment, 3% tax, [and] 2% trusts and estates.” Career Center: Practice Area 
Survey Results, supra note 166. Due to shifts in market conditions, however, 
those same law school respondents later expressed the following practice area 
interests: “67% litigation, 47% corporate, 40% bankruptcy, 29% employment, 
27% real estate, 22% trusts and estates, [and] 19% tax.” Id. The “percentages 
add up to more than 100% because respondents” were permitted to express 
interest in more than one practice area. Id.
 169. The Undergraduate Education for a Corporate Law Career, VAULTBLOGS
(Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.vault.com/blog/vaults-law-blog-legal-careers-and-
industry-news/the-undergraduate-education-for-a-corporate-law-career 
(“Certainly, many successful lawyers enter law school with little to no prior 
study of business, finance or law.”).  
 170. For that reason, students may be advantaged in general by a shorter 
curriculum in the sense that a legal education will cost less. On the other hand, 
those who are likely to benefit the most are not the students with the greatest 
need, but those who come from the most privileged backgrounds and come to 
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Morgan recognizes that law schools supplanted 
apprenticeships because law schools were able to teach law 
in a more systematic way, not being dependent on the 
vagaries of an individual lawyer’s caseload or pedagogical 
inclination.171 According to Morgan, what law schools are 
good at doing is teaching of that kind.172 Morgan has little 
interest in the kinds of skills training championed by the 
MacCrate and Carnegie reports.173 Law schools are not 
particularly good at that kind of teaching, Morgan argues, 
and can provide it only at great cost.174 Moreover, even 
purporting to draw up a list of skills that all lawyers should 
have is a fool’s errand because such lists are premised on 
the false assumption that there is a unitary legal profession 
that students will join when they graduate. In Morgan’s 
view, the skills championed by the MacCrate Report will be 
useless to many—perhaps most—law graduates.175 Most of 
his “business consultants” would better spend their time 
studying comparative law or learning languages or taking 
business school classes. Indeed, many will have profited 
more from what they learned in their preprofessional 
training than from what law school has to offer.176 Thus, the 
legal study with a leg up, though they sometimes lose that advantage over the 
three-year course, assuming that the law school is doing its job. Soia 
Mentschikoff was fond of saying that the true test of a law school was not the 
competence of its best students, but the competence of those at the bottom of the 
class. Today we might put it differently, that is, that the test of a law school is 
not what it does to educate those who come with the greatest advantages, but 
those who come with the least. We do not necessarily argue here in favor of a 
three-year curriculum, but simply suggest that the choice may be more 
complicated than some proponents of a shorter curriculum have suggested.  
 171. See MORGAN, supra note 97, at 187-88.  
 172. Morgan suggests a number of things that all legally trained persons 
should know; the list is wise, if somewhat conventional. See id. at 178-84. 
However, Morgan also suggests that the knowledge represented by this list can 
be imparted in a brief period of time. See id. at 214 (advocating that law school 
be shortened to two years).  
 173. For a description of these reports, see MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 88; 
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 88.
 174. See MORGAN, supra note 97, at 210.  
 175. See id. at 182-84.  
 176. See id. at 185.  
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changes urged by the MacCrate and Carnegie reports “point 
legal education in substantially the wrong directions and 
have seemingly ignored what is happening to the legal 
profession itself.”177
To be effective, as Morgan suggests, lawyers need to 
have skills and knowledge beyond what is taught in law 
school, whether that be science or engineering for 
intellectual property lawyers, foreign language proficiency 
and cultural knowledge in the case of international lawyers, 
or navigation in the case of admiralty lawyers.178 Yet legal 
employers today do regularly complain about the skills 
levels of current law graduates, and the list of skills found 
wanting usually correlates with those contained in the 
MacCrate and Carnegie reports.179
How will students acquire the skills that employers 
believe they need if law schools are not the proper venue for 
learning them? Only a limited amount of mentoring occurs 
in the large firms because it is so expensive.180 When one 
combines the billing rates of the potential mentors with 
those of the neophyte lawyers to be mentored, the 
 177. Id. at 200. 
 178. Id. at 211-12.  
 179. See, e.g., Tom Hentoff, The Secrets of Superstar Associates, LITIG., Spring 
2006, at 24, 24 (noting that young associates with the ability to succeed at 
important assignments are in “agonizingly short supply”); Richard A. Posner & 
Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal Representation, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 317, 338 (2011) (survey of judges finding that “law schools should 
provide more course work oriented to instilling practice-oriented skills”); Viator, 
supra note 6, at 741 (noting that judges and firms’ hiring partners “criticize the 
lamentable writing of modern law students”). 
 180. See, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of 
Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour 
Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 281 (2000) (examining how short-term 
metrics contribute to the decline of mentoring, adversely affecting junior 
attorneys, as well as their clients); David E. Van Zandt, Client-Ready Law 
Graduates, LITIG., Fall 2009, at 11, 11 (“[I]ncreased leverage pressures . . . 
necessitate that their newer associates do, in fact, work with clients and lead 
teams from the beginning of their tenures. . . . As a result, the traditional 
training method of associate-partner mentoring gets sacrificed.”). 
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opportunity costs of mentoring are substantial.181 It is not 
surprising that law firms wince at the idea of teaching 
recent graduates to draft interrogatories or write a brief at 
a combined cost of what may amount to more than $1000 an 
hour. Indeed, the cost of the partner’s time is often 
dispositive in itself. In other practice venues, the chief 
impediment to mentoring is not the value of time, but time 
itself. Quite simply, senior-level government and public 
interest lawyers in resource-stretched offices often do not 
have the time to mentor younger lawyers.  
According to Morgan, the answer to this problem may 
well rest with the very law firms that have thus far 
shunned mentoring.182 Morgan imagines a modified 
apprenticeship system in which recent graduates accept 
lower salaries in exchange for more mentoring.183 Few debt-
saddled law graduates have indicated an interest in such a 
model. Nor have many firms. Howrey, which Morgan holds 
up as a model in this respect, vanished shortly after the 
book was published.184 It is the value of the mentor’s time 
that makes mentoring undesirable for employers.185
Furthermore, law firms do not work with the kind of 
regularity with which law schools function. Circumstances
continually change in the practice of law; meetings are 
postponed; emergencies intervene.186 Despite the best of 
intentions, the reduced-wage associate may well receive 
 181. Big law partners may charge as much as $1250 per hour. See Vanessa 
O’Connell, Big Law’s $1,000-Plus an Hour Club, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2011, at 
B1. 
 182. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 163-64.  
 183. Id. at 164.  
 184. Id. Michael J. De La Merced, Howrey Law Firm Dissolves After Slow 
Bleed of Partners, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 10, 2011, 4:26 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/howrey-law-firm-dissolves-after-slow-
bleed-of-partners.  
 185. See Fortney, supra note 180, at 281. 
 186. See, e.g., Edward M. Slaughter & K.C. Ashmore, Can I Bill For This? A 
Call for Mentoring in the Modern Law Firm, Defense Ethics and 
Professionalism, FOR DEFENSE, Dec. 2008, at 74, 81 (“The pressures of modern 
practice make it difficult for law firms to foster the kind of mentoring 
relationships that ensure these needs are met.”).  
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very little additional mentoring in exchange for her reduced 
wages, and the mentoring she receives will likely come from 
underutilized lawyers, rather than from the firm’s most 
talented practitioners or most effective mentors.187 That 
would be consistent with the experience of many law firm 
associates who have opted for reduced hours at reduced pay, 
only to learn that they had effectively signed on for virtually 
full-time scut work at part-time pay.188
Morgan acknowledges that lawyers did much good work 
for the public while operating under the mistaken idea that 
it was part of their collective identity or “professional” 
responsibility, and he sees no reason why that should not 
continue in the future, even when the “professionalism” 
scales have fallen from their eyes.189 Looking back at past 
efforts to foster professionalism, one must acknowledge that 
more was involved than hollow phrases. Efforts to improve 
the law’s rationality and fairness, to eliminate invidious 
discrimination, to improve the efficient administration of 
justice, and to enhance opportunities for all of our citizens 
have occupied the public careers of many of the nation’s 
finest lawyers, often at real personal cost to themselves.190
But there is no reason to believe that such work, in all 
its variety and diversity, necessarily will continue, let alone 
that it will continue to be done in the same spirit of the 
public interest.191 Many of the lawyers who did the work 
 187. See Paul H. Burton, What Money Can’t Buy: Organic Mentoring in Law 
Firms, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2007, at 13, 13 (“Organic, mano a mano mentoring is 
all but extinct in today’s frenetic legal environment.”). 
 188. See William D. Henderson & David Zaring, Young Associates in Trouble,
105 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2007) (“Firms may persuade associates to stay 
longer by requiring shorter hours, being family friendly, and increasing 
opportunities to obtain partnerships. But it is unclear that profit-maximizing 
firms—or, more accurately, firms seeking to retain rainmaking partners—would 
be likely to do so.”).  
 189. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 69.  
 190. See generally KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION 
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012). 
 191. That such work will be done in the public interest, rather than for the 
benefit of lawyers and their clients, is a demanding ideal to put into practice. 
See, e.g., Alex Elson & Michael Shakman, The ALI Principles of Corporate 
Governance: A Tainted Process and a Flawed Product, 49 BUS. LAW. 1761, 1765 
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Morgan admires were formed and educated, in Philip 
Jackson’s sense, by the values of a profession that 
understood itself to be so defined and obligated.192 It is 
possible that some part (but certainly not all) of this work 
will appeal to Morgan’s “business consultants.” But one 
wonders what, if anything, will anchor the admittedly 
demanding requirement that this work should be done, not 
for private advantage, but for the public interest. Clearly, it 
is not enough to say that “all citizens have a moral 
obligation to devote their best efforts to using their skills in 
ways that contribute to the public interest.”193
B.
Brian Z. Tamanaha’s book, Failing Law Schools,
addresses the current “costs” and financial pay-offs of a 
legal education.194 As Tamanaha explains, “[t]his book 
challenges fundamental economic aspects of the operation of 
law schools, although I do not go deeply into pedagogical 
issues. What got us into this position is our hunger for 
revenue and chase for prestige.”195 For most people, 
(1994) (measuring the American Law Institute’s principles of corporate 
governance project against the Institute’s traditional view that client interests 
must be “‘le[ft] . . . at the door’”) (quoting Rita Henley Jensen, Navigating
Turbulent Waters at ALI: The American Law Institute Brings Its Corporate 
Governance Principles to Harbor, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1)). Once the spirit 
of professionalism is exorcised, however, there is no reason to believe that even 
the motivation for acting in the public interest will persist.  
 192. See JACKSON, supra note 89, at 94; see also Harry T. Edwards, Renewing 
Our Commitment to the Highest Ideals of the Legal Profession, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1421, 1422, 1429 (2006) (arguing that “global, economic, technological, and 
demographic changes should neither determine nor even affect the fundamental 
values of the legal profession,” and that “when students graduate from law 
schools, they should have more than a good understanding of the ethical [and 
pro bono] standards of [the] profession”).  
 193. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 69. 
 194. See generally TAMANAHA, supra note 63.  
 195. Id. at xii. Tamanaha views the law schools’ “hunger for revenue” as a 
recent phenomenon fueled by faculty self-interest, which presumably is 
manifested in higher salaries, useless research, and a decrease in teaching 
loads, all of which are responsible for the need for additional faculty. See id. at 
xii, 62-68. Almost fifty years ago, however, Dean John Ritchie of the 
Northwestern Law School hazarded a series of predictions about the future 
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according to Tamanaha, legal education is simply a bad 
investment.196 His goal, then, is to “expos[e] the disconnect 
between the cost of a legal education and the economic 
return it brings and find[] ways to fix it.”197 In Tamanaha’s 
view, the high cost of a legal education is attributable to 
“the costs and consequences of [law professors’] academic 
pursuits”198 and the fact that “two generations of law 
students have been willing and able to plunk down 
whatever law schools charged.”199 The lesson is clear: “The 
economic model of law school is broken,”200 and until the 
current models of legal education are altered, there is no 
shape of legal education, not based on faculty self-interest, but on what he took 
to be the requirements of a sound legal education for the practice of law. John 
Ritchie, Legal Education in the United States, 21 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177, 181-
87 (1964). Ritchie predicted “a substantial increase” in faculty-to-student ratios, 
resulting from a pedagogically justified and “insistent demand for relatively 
small classes.” Id. at 184-85. “Reducing the size of classes,” he observed, “will, of 
course, require an increase in the size of the faculty.” Id. at 185. He also 
predicted “a substantial increase in the funds allotted . . . for legal research,” as 
well as a greater emphasis on interdisciplinary and empirical work. Id. And 
Ritchie focused on a theme briefly touched on by Tamanaha, namely, the 
tension between theory and practice. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 54-55; 
Ritchie, supra, at 186. As his “last guess,” Ritchie predicted  
that the divergent views on the relative importance of training in 
practical skills and in legal theory that have characterized legal 
education . . . since colonial times, will continue . . . . But the 
Jeffersonian view of the relevance of social science materials in training 
students . . . seems to be steadily gaining support and . . . will attain 
ascendency over the Story-Langdell insistence that law students’ 
attention should be focused exclusively on “Legal materials.”  
Ritchie supra, at 186. Ritchie’s observations suggest that the explanations for 
law faculty expansion, reduced teaching loads, increased emphasis on 
scholarship, and the inherent tensions between theory and practice, are more 
complex than Tamanaha’s economic analysis would suggest, perhaps even 
originating in the roots of the profession and in honest efforts to grapple with 
the demands of providing a quality professional education.  
 196. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at x-xi. 
 197. Id. at xi.  
 198. Id. at 54.  
 199. Id. at 132.  
 200. Id. at x, 105.  
2014] THE WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT  717
hope to “rectify the warped economic arrangement that law 
schools have created.”201 In other words, the problem is cost. 
Tamanaha is obviously correct, not in the sense that 
cost is the only problem (let alone the simple one that he 
describes), but in the sense that the cost of legal education, 
like that of all higher education, is indeed a serious 
problem.202 There are many reasons for the high cost of 
higher education. The declining public support for public 
universities is part of the problem;203 so, too, is the decline in 
endowment income that accompanied the onset of the Great 
Recession. The general inadequacy of education at all levels 
and the unequal distribution of educational opportunity also 
come into play.204 Tamanaha’s book is ultimately 
 201. Id. at 182.  
 202. As Tamanaha explains, the problem begins with undergraduate 
education. “From 1985 to 2009, tuition increased by 327 percent at private 
undergraduate institutions and by 375 percent at private law schools. . . . Total 
student debt[] [accounting for both undergraduate and postgraduate education] 
has increased 511 percent since 1999.” Id. at 129. The problem is not limited to 
law students, but to students in many fields that require postgraduate 
education, such as social workers, clergy, English teachers, veterinarians, and 
scholars in the humanities. Many fields require expensive postgraduate 
education but provide uncertain employment prospects and afford modest 
compensation even to those who can find employment. See Graduate School in 
the Humanities: Just Don’t Go, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 30, 2009), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Graduate-School-in-the/44846. 
 203. Declining taxpayer support for public higher education, which reflects a 
lack of social consensus about public higher education as a public good, is at 
least partially responsible for higher tuition. See Gary Fethke, Why Does Tuition 
Go Up? Because Taxpayer Support Goes Down, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 6, 
2012, at A28; see also Sandy Baum & Michael McPherson, Is Education a Public 
Good or a Private Good?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 18, 2011), http://chronicle. 
com/blogs/innovations/is-education-a-public-good-or-a-private-good/28329 (“Higher 
 education is not a pure public good. It is clearly possible to exclude people who 
do not pay. What people who call education a public good mean is that there are 
positive externalities—not all of the benefits accrue to the students.”).  
 204. See, e.g., Meredith Phillips & Tiffani Chin, School Inequality: What Do We 
Know?, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 467, 510 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004) (“[A]t 
the beginning of the twenty-first century disparities in teachers’ education, 
credentials, experience, subject matter knowledge, and cognitive skills continue 
to favor white and nonpoor schools.”); Adam Gamoran, What Will Decrease 
Educational Inequality? WIS. CENTER FOR EDUC. RESEARCH, http://www. 
wcer.wisc.edu/news/coverStories/decrease_ed_inequity.php (last visited Jan. 29, 
2011) (assessing socioeconomic bases for the educational inequality between 
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disappointing, not because it is about costs, but because it is 
only about costs. As noted, it is not part of Tamanaha’s plan 
to “go deeply” into the pedagogical concerns or imperatives 
of legal education. He seems to think that the discussion 
can proceed without considering what law schools are—or 
should be—trying to accomplish pedagogically.205 He also 
seems to think that we need not consider the work that 
lawyers do, the role that they play in society, or how they 
can be prepared most effectively for what they do.206 But cost 
is not an independent variable, and cost cutting is not an 
exercise that can be undertaken without considering the 
necessary qualities of the product one wishes to produce or 
the conditions under which it must be produced.  
Tamanaha’s book may suffer from the critical 
assumption that the value of a legal education can be 
measured only in terms of an individual consumer’s 
anticipated financial return, but the book has much value 
nonetheless, as a consumer’s guide to legal education.207
Tamanaha has gathered a wealth of useful and valuable 
whites and minorities). See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE 
NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (2005); JAMES E.
RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE 
STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (2010). 
 205. See, e.g., Sullivan & Podgor, supra note 94, at 151 (“The teaching of 
professionalism is critical to the health of the legal profession and the society it 
serves.”); see also Patrick E. Longan, Teaching Professionalism, 60 MERCER L.
REV. 659, 699 (2008) (“Teaching first-year law students about professionalism is 
important. In the end, of course, this instruction must have a central purpose: to 
make it more likely that the next generation of lawyers will practice with 
professionalism.”). 
 206. The extent of Tamanaha’s emphasis on costs is somewhat reminiscent of 
the literature on “cost disease,” often applied to aspects of civil society that 
traditionally fall in the public domain, and for a long time were considered 
immune from market pressures. For recent examples of this form of analysis, 
see generally ROBERT J. FLANAGAN, THE PERILOUS LIFE OF SYMPHONY 
ORCHESTRAS: ARTISTIC TRIUMPHS AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES (2012) (following in 
the footsteps of the classic study in the field, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WILLIAM G.
BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS: THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA (1966); as well as the study 
of the neoliberal transformation of basic scientific research in PHILIP MIROWSKI,
SCIENCE-MART: PRIVATIZING AMERICAN SCIENCE (2011)). Needless to say, 
American universities have come under similar scrutiny and pressures. 
 207. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 145-59.  
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data, statistics, and information on law schools, from 
admissions to tuition to employment prospects and debt 
burdens.208 He explains how the schools assemble the 
metrics and is appropriately critical of the lack of 
transparency with which law schools shape and disseminate 
information, to say nothing of the brazen distortions and 
misrepresentations that some of them have sometimes 
employed.209 Anyone seeking to understand the factors 
contributing to the costs of legal education or the processes 
by which law schools gather and present their numbers will 
find this study useful. Moreover, Tamanaha is right about 
the effects of cascading student debt: the luckier students 
may feel compelled to accept an otherwise undesirable 
position simply because it will facilitate loan repayment, 
while the least fortunate may not find any job that will 
allow them to do that.210
On the other hand, Tamanaha’s analysis is largely 
untethered from any vision of what an optimal legal 
education might entail, let alone the relationship of such an 
education to the demands placed on the legal profession in a 
democracy. There is little in this book about the public role 
of lawyers. Tamanaha is dismissive of Michael Olivas’s 2011 
description, as president of the Association of American Law 
Schools (AALS), of law as a “public profession,” and 
ridicules the idea that law professors somehow engage in 
“public service”; educating lawyers could not possibly make 
a net contribution to society.211 Tamanaha largely ignores 
the historical literature on the profession (including the 
debates over whether law is a public or purely private 
calling), overlooking how both pressure for change and 
actual change have regularly occurred in legal education 
and the profession.212
 208. See id. at 107-18, 161.  
 209. See id. at 72-78.  
 210. See id. at 77.  
 211. Id. at 29-31; Letter from Michael A. Olivas, President, Ass’n Am. Law 
Sch., to Hulett H. “Bucky” Askew, Consultant on Legal Educ., Am. Bar Ass’n 3 
(Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.aals.org/advocacy/Olivas.pdf. 
 212. For overviews of the trajectory of historical change in American legal 
education, see William W. Fisher III, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 1920-
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In the morality tale that Tamanaha tells, the principal 
victims are the students: most are incurring great debt for 
no purpose.213 The villains are many: the ABA, the AALS, 
the U.S. News law school rankings,214 elite law schools, the 
federal loan policies that facilitate law school attendance, 
pampered law professors (and their unproductive scholarly 
habits), and law school administrators who are the law 
professors’ enablers or fellow travelers.215 All allegedly have 
contributed to an environment in which law schools are not 
simply failing, but sowing the seeds of their own 
destruction. 
According to Tamanaha, the alarming rise in law school 
tuition is mainly the product of a self-serving system of 
2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 34 (Michael Grossberg & 
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); Hugh C. Macgill & R. Kent Newmyer, Legal 
Education and Legal Thought, 1790-1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW 
IN AMERICA 36 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). For views 
and analysis of changes over the history of the American legal profession, see 
ABEL, supra note 47; JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW:
THE LAW MAKERS (1950); Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 
1870-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 73 (Michael 
Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); Alfred S. Konefsky, The Legal 
Profession: From the Revolution to the Civil War, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF LAW IN AMERICA 68 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
 213. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 108-25. Tamanaha also expresses 
concern about the impact that the economics of legal education has on the 
availability of legal representation, but it is far from clear that his solutions will 
improve the situation. See id. at 170-71. 
 214. As Tamanaha notes, U.S. News is “the surviving rump of a defunct 
magazine,” which now busies itself with ranking educational institutions. Id. at 
79. It is ironic that the rankings emanate from a company that was apparently 
unable to succeed in its own core business. While Tamanaha is correct in 
suggesting that the rankings have caused many law schools to act corruptly, 
with respect to the reporting of data and so forth, see id. at 78-84, it is unlikely 
that many important decisions would be made differently if law schools were 
simply competing against each other, rather than competing in the shadow of 
the rankings. For example, Tamanaha questions the emphasis on merit 
scholarships as opposed to need-based scholarships, see id. at 97-98, but most 
law schools are likely to use their resources to secure the best-qualified students 
they can even if U.S. News is not looking over their shoulders. While they might 
be somewhat more creative in evaluating candidates for admission if they did 
not have to make their LSAT scores a matter of public record, that possibility 
seems remote, to say the least. 
 215. See generally id. at 7, 107-66.  
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“self-regulation.”216 The root of the problem is the law school 
accreditation standards, which are promulgated and 
enforced by the ABA (and abetted by the AALS). They 
require all law schools to meet the same minimum 
standards, regardless of a school’s individual vision or 
mission. As a result, “students must pay a premium that 
attaches to accreditation.”217 The standards require that law 
schools operate on a tenure model and “preclude[] law 
schools from relying more heavily on cheaper adjuncts.”218
 216. See id. at 8-21.  
 217. Id. at 19.  
 218. Id. at 126. For many years, the accreditation standards promulgated by 
the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar have included 
certain provisions relating to security of position for various categories of faculty 
members. See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2013-2014 Standards 402-04 (2013). In recent years, there has been 
much discussion, both within the Section of Legal Education and in the broader 
community, about the desirability of having such provisions included within the 
standards, what classes of faculty (if any) should be covered by them, and how 
their language should be interpreted. Currently, Standard 405(a) and (b) 
provide in general terms that “[a] law school shall establish and maintain 
conditions adequate to attract and maintain a competent faculty” and that it 
“shall have an established and announced policy with respect to academic 
freedom and tenure . . . .” More specifically, Standard 405(c) provides that “[a] 
law school shall afford to full-time clinical faculty members a form of security of 
position reasonably similar to tenure, and noncompensatory perquisites 
reasonably similar to those provided other full-time faculty members.” The 
ABA’s official interpretation of Standard 405(c) provides that “[a] form of 
security of position reasonably similar to tenure includes a separate tenure 
track or a program of renewable long-term contracts,” meaning a contract of at 
least five years’ duration that is “presumptively renewable or other 
arrangement sufficient to ensure academic freedom,” and that “[d]uring the 
initial long-term contract or any renewal period, the contract may be terminated 
for good cause, including termination or material modification of the entire 
clinical program.” Id. at Interpretation 405-6. Standard 405(c) also makes clear 
that it “does not preclude a limited number of fixed, short-term appointments in 
a clinical program predominantly staffed by full-time faculty members, or in an 
experimental program of limited duration.”
In the past, much controversy surrounded the definition and implementation of 
the “reasonably similar to tenure” language. For example, prior to the adoption 
of the current interpretation, the Accreditation Committee (which is responsible 
for determining a law school’s compliance with the standards) took the position 
that a one-year contract provided security of employment “reasonably similar to 
tenure.” AALS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND ABA ACCREDITATION POLICY TASK 
FORCE OPEN FORUM 32-33 (2007), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/
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The problem is exacerbated because academic lawyers (like 
other university teachers) value the creation of new 
knowledge. Indeed, universities reinforce that focus by 
giving substantial weight to scholarly production in 
decisions concerning promotion, tenure, and 
legaled/AC%20Task%20Force/AC%20Task%20Force%202007%20Open%20Hear
ing.txt (remarks of Paulette Williams) (“At Northwestern there are 31 full-time 
clinicians who are on one-year contracts and Northwestern has been found to be 
in compliance with 405(c).”). Most disinterested observers have found absurd 
the proposition that a one-year contract provides security of employment 
“reasonably similar to tenure.” Several other provisions also relate to security of 
position. Standard 206 provides that “[e]xcept in extraordinary circumstances, a 
dean shall also hold appointment as a member of the faculty with tenure,” and 
Standard 603 provides that “[e]xcept in extraordinary circumstances, a law 
library director shall hold a law faculty appointment with security of faculty 
position.” Standard 405(d) provides that “[a] law school shall afford legal writing 
teachers such security of position and other rights and privileges of faculty 
membership as may be necessary to (1) attract and retain a faculty that is well-
qualified to provide legal writing instruction . . . .” But most universities have 
tenure systems in place that would cover some of these categories of law school 
faculty, without regard to the ABA’s standards. Thus, the most immediate 
practical effects of the ABA requirement have been (a) to require law schools 
that are not part of a university to adopt systems “reasonably similar to tenure,” 
and (b) in the case of other law schools, to specify which categories of faculty are 
entitled to which sorts of protection.  
The wisdom of these provisions is open to debate, both in themselves and as 
accreditation standards, and there is much ongoing discussion about them. 
Certainly, there is an argument to be made in favor of granting more autonomy 
to law schools. On the other hand, it may be argued that some of the 
requirements are so central to minimum quality concerns and the nature of the 
academic enterprise that uniformity is desirable. It is frequently argued that 
these requirements add significantly to the cost of a legal education. But that 
proposition remains contested. To be sure, these requirements occasionally 
protect faculty who, for one reason or another, are underperforming. Economic 
analysis, however, would suggest that it would cost more to hire top-flight 
faculty without offering them some form of job security than it would be to hire 
them with it. Tamanaha is correct in noting that the accreditation standards for 
other professional schools do not impose such requirements. Cf. TAMANAHA,
supra note 63, at 31. Those who support the requirement would doubtless 
suggest that the analogy is flawed because most other professional education 
takes place in schools that are part of a university and that the nature of law 
makes the protection of academic freedom a more real concern for law teachers 
than for some others. See Brian Leiter, Should the ABA Require Faculty Tenure 
for Accreditation?, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL REPORTS (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/08/should-the-aba-require-faculty-
tenure-for-accreditation.html.  
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compensation.219 Scholarly production is also the way to be 
noticed (and recruited) by higher-ranked institutions. 
Unlike some other fields, however, legal scholarship seldom 
finds outside support. Law schools therefore typically 
subsidize faculty research through endowment income and 
tuition.220 Moreover, many law schools have reduced 
teaching loads to permit greater scholarly production.221
That creates the need for more faculty members, thereby 
adding to the costs of legal education.222 To meet those costs, 
law schools must increase endowment, increase tuition, 
increase enrollments,223 or, most likely, do all three.  
Tamanaha claims that faculty scholarship does not 
merit such support because little of it is useful to the bench 
and bar or even cited by other scholars.224 In addition, he 
suggests that law schools act from impure motives: they 
support scholarship because it adds to the law school’s 
“reputation”—an important but illusive factor in the 
rankings.225 Others have also questioned the value of legal 
 219. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 42-44. 
 220. See, e.g., Bourne, supra note 6, at 692-93 (arguing that “forty percent of 
faculty salaries go into [faculty scholarship],” and these salaries are funded by 
student tuition); Edward Rubin, Should Law Schools Support Faculty 
Research?, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 139, 145 (2008) (“The cross-subsidy 
from student tuition to faculty research remains substantial.”).  
 221. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 40-44.  
 222. See id. at 44.  
 223. Of course, increased enrollments result in the production of more law 
graduates competing for a smaller number of jobs. See LAW SCH. ADMISSION 
COUNCIL & AM. BAR ASS’N, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 866
(2013); available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
misc/legal_education/2013_official_guide_aba_approved_schools.authcheckdam.
pdf (stating overall JD enrollment has increased from 119,847 in 1984-1985 to 
144,288 in 2011-2012); Hannah D’Apice, June Jobs Report: Legal Industry 
Continues to Shrink, AM LAW DAILY (July 8, 2011, 6:34 PM), 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/07/junejobsrepor.html (noting 
simultaneous increase in lawyers and decrease in lawyer jobs). 
 224. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 55-60.  
 225. See id. at 85; Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal Education’s “Wicked 
Problems,” 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 949 (2009) (suggesting that law schools are 
constantly striving “to improve how they are regarded within . . . the 
hierarc[hy]”); Sam Flanigan & Robert Morse, Methodology: Best Law Schools 
Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (March 11, 2013), http://www. 
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scholarship, usually on the ground that much (or most) of it 
is too abstract and too far removed from the problems that 
judges and lawyers are required to solve.226
But perceptive observers have argued that such views 
are based on too narrow an understanding of usefulness.227
Moreover, much scholarly work does concern problems 
actually faced by lawyers and judges and contributes 
directly to law reform.228 Indeed, such contributions are 
particularly critical now, when many practitioner 
usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2013/03/11/ 
methodology-best-law-schools-rankings (explaining that so-called peer 
assessment (25%) and assessment by lawyers and judges (15%) account for 40% 
of a law school’s weighted average). While Tamanaha complains that tuition 
dollars are being invested in efforts to increase the reputation of the school, 
students and alumni clearly benefit if such a strategy is actually successful. See 
TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 126. But see David C. Yamada, Same Old, Same 
Old: Law School Rankings and the Affirmation of Hierarchy, 31 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 249, 262 (1997) (explaining that rankings simply confirm long understood 
hierarchy of institutional prestige). 
 226. Tamanaha notes that Judge Harry Edwards and Chief Justice John 
Roberts have taken the same position. TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 55-56. 
There is also empirical support for proposition that the current Justices cite 
legal scholarship less frequently than their predecessors. See, e.g., Brent E. 
Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First-Century 
Supreme Court Justices: An Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399, 408-09 
tbl. 1 (2012) (giving an empirical analysis that shows that the current Justices 
cite law review articles less frequently than their predecessors). 
 227. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching 
and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1928 (1993) (arguing that Judge 
Edwards’s criteria for worthwhile scholarship are excessively narrow); see also 
Anthony T. Kronman, Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 
955, 969 (1981) (arguing that legal scholarship helps law professors meet their 
responsibility as moral educators, as it assists the professor in “achiev[ing] a 
better understanding of his own vocation and its meaning”); Deborah L. Rhode, 
Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1330 (2002) (arguing that for 
scholars in a professional school, “at least part of the mission is to advance 
understanding and promote improvement of their profession and its 
institutions,” which “includes all of the contexts in which law is developed, 
enforced, interpreted, and practiced”). 
 228. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Promoting Criminal Justice Reform Through 
Legal Scholarship: Toward A Taxonomy, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 161, 176 
(2007) (setting forward a nonexhaustive sketch of how “legal scholarship can—
and does—contribute to the reform of criminal justice.”); see generally WILLIAM
J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011). 
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interventions may reflect their clients’ self-interest, rather 
than any independent assessment of the public interest.229 It 
may be, of course, that much of the most immediately useful 
work is not being done at the most prestigious schools or 
being published in their journals.  
Tamanaha also takes aim at the effect of increased 
faculty salaries on tuition.230 Tamanaha’s concern is 
justified, but his is a peculiar complaint for a believer in 
markets. To be sure, increases in faculty salaries must be 
paid for—by increased endowment income or by increased 
tuition revenues. But increases in faculty salaries are the 
product of the market for human capital. Here, the elite law 
schools act as the ultimate salary pacesetters, vying with 
one another for the best-known scholars.231 However, the 
competition goes down as far as law schools can afford it, 
and law school salaries reflect the impact of competition 
virtually throughout the system.232
But much of the higher cost of law school is also 
attributable to improvements in legal education, on the one 
hand, and to consumer choice, on the other. The need for 
significant improvements in legal education was obvious as 
early as 1964, when Dean John Ritchie of Northwestern 
 229. See, e.g., Elson & Shakman, supra note 191, at 1765-66 (suggesting the 
ALI’s principles of corporate governance depart from its traditional view that 
members “leave their clients’ interests at the door”); Kelly J. Lynch, Best 
Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. &
POL. 33, 54 (2004) (reporting the attention paid by an overwhelming majority of 
Supreme Court clerks to an “academically oriented” amicus brief filed by “a 
prominent academic [who] takes a disinterested view.”). 
 230. TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 52.  
 231. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Law Faculty as Free Agents, 17 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 213, 218-19 (2008). 
 232. Many law schools apparently follow a practice of meeting offers that 
individual faculty members receive from other schools. Thus, the more 
aggressive faculty regularly negotiate with other schools, not with a view 
toward moving, but simply for the purpose of making more money where they 
are. That practice may result in substantial non-merit-based differentials within 
the faculty. Because conscientious deans shrink from having to administer 
salary schedules that are grossly unfair, they must decide whether to require 
everyone to prove his or her auction value or depend on their own judgments, 
which may include having to raise the salaries of professors who, for one reason 
or another, are not prone to make a constant test of their value.  
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Law School offered a number of suggestions for improving 
legal pedagogy.233 Prominent among them was the need for 
smaller classes, higher student-faculty ratios, and more 
interdisciplinary courses.234 Shortly thereafter, legal 
educators began to see the need for clinical and simulation 
opportunities. In addition, much fundamental rethinking of 
legal education took place as a result of the pathbreaking 
contributions of Donald Schön and others to the theory of 
education for the professions.235 In combination, these 
trends and concerns radically changed the nature of legal 
education in the United States, producing a pedagogical 
model relying much more heavily on the interaction of small 
groups of students with professors. Those innovations have 
been costly, but they have been driven by real pedagogical 
concerns, not faculty self-interest.  
But consumer demand also has been influential in 
raising the cost of legal education. Law schools do not build 
law school facilities to meet minimum ABA standards, but 
to satisfy the high expectations of prospective students. In 
addition, law students expect—and need—far more 
extensive student services than in the past.236 Today’s law 
students are much more diverse.237 They also need and 
expect expert assistance in identifying employment 
opportunities.238 Many of these changes are good; they 
 233. See Ritchie, supra note 195, at 181-87. 
 234. See id.
 235. See generally DONALD A. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW
PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983). 
 236. See, e.g., Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Bridging the Law School Learning Gap 
Through Universal Design, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1393, 1418-30 (2012) (arguing that 
law schools must provide students good counseling, mentoring, support, and a 
host of other services). 
 237. See Aaron N. Taylor, As Law Schools Struggle, Diversity Offers 
Opportunities, CHRON. HIGH. EDUC. (Feb. 10, 2014), http://chronicle.com/
article/As-Law-Schools-Struggle/144631 (“Today, students of color account for 26 
percent of all law students. Ten years ago, the proportion was 21 percent; 40 
years ago, it was 10 percent.”). 
 238. Menachem Wecker, Students Must Take More Active Role in Job Hunt, 
Law Schools Say, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.
usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2011/11/30/ 
students-must-take-more-active-role-in-job-hunt-law-schools-say (“[A] third-year 
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signify that students who would not have been admitted to 
law school a generation ago are now being given the 
opportunity to pursue a career that would have been closed 
to them. But they also put an additional strain on resources.  
For Tamanaha, the economic lesson is clear. Unless you 
graduate from an elite law school (and the more elite the 
better), with very little (or at least manageable) student 
loan debt burden, and are headed to a large firm that pays 
high salaries right from the start (though those salaries 
may now be on the decline), law school is probably not 
worth the investment.239 The run of law schools are too 
expensive and force students to accumulate too much 
debt.240 Particularly for the graduates of lower- and middle-
ranked schools (now conveniently evaluated—or 
stigmatized—by U.S. News), the likelihood of breaking into 
the elite job market is slim, and the job opportunities and 
salaries available elsewhere will make it difficult to pay off 
one’s debt and still lead a reasonably comfortable life. With 
a few exceptions—namely, elites and some public law 
schools that are still relatively less expensive and deliver 
quality legal education—the law schools are engaged in a 
race to the bottom.241
law student . . . admits that his impression upon entering law school was that 
the school’s Career Development Office ought to find him a job.”).  
 239. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at x-xi. Recently Tamanaha’s assertions 
about the lack of economic value of a law degree have been placed in 
considerable doubt across the spectrum of law schools. See Michael Simkovic & 
Frank McIntryre, Populist Outrage, Reckless Empirics: A Review of Failing Law 
Schools, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 176 (2014), http://www.law. 
northwestern.edu/lawreview/online/2014/1/Simkovic&McIntyre.pdf. Simkovic 
explains the methodology and findings of the study and responds to Tamanaha’s 
reactions on Brian Leiter’s blog. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Brian Tamanaha’s 
Straw Men (Part 1): Why We Used SIPP Data from 1996 to 2011, BRIAN LEITER’S
L. SCH. REP. (July 24, 2013, 5:17 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/ 
leiter/2013/07/brian-tamanahas-straw-men-part-1-why-we-used-sipp-data-from-
1996-to-2011.html (the first of numerous guest posts); see also Brian Leiter, 
Reflections on “The Economic Value of a Law Degree” and the Response to It,
BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REP. (July 30, 2013, 4:54 AM), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/the-economic-value-of-a-law-
degree-redux-1-1.html. 
 240. TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 109-12.  
 241. Id. at 184-85.  
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It is difficult to know from Tamanaha’s account how to 
assign relative responsibility to the various villains of the 
piece. After all, even if the ABA regulations were repealed 
entirely, law schools would still continue to engage in many 
of the same cost-inflating activities, which are really the 
product of the rankings rather than regulation.242 Moreover, 
even if the rankings vanished, the law schools would still 
continue to engage in many of these activities because law 
schools will always compete with one another unless the 
market becomes so thoroughly oligopolistic as to drive most 
law schools from the field.  
What are Tamanaha’s proposed solutions? They focus 
primarily on ways to reduce costs, and, when possible, 
stimulate productivity. Perhaps the most important, from 
Tamanaha’s perspective, is to tighten loan eligibility 
requirements and cap the total federal loan dollars made 
available to the students of individual law schools.243
Tamanaha professes agreement with the propositions that 
“[p]roviding access to legal careers is essential” and that 
“[t]he legal system will suffer if only the wealthy can attend 
law school,”244 but he views the loan programs as a market 
distortion—an incentive for law schools to continue to ramp 
up prices, with the results that fewer and fewer students 
can really afford a legal education and the legal needs of the 
poor and the middle class will go unmet.245
 242. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating Our Cake and Having It, Too: Why Real 
Change Is So Difficult in Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 359, 368 (2006) (attributing 
the “publications war” to the rankings’ “academic reputation score”); Michael 
Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. News & 
World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 105, 122-25 & tbl. 2 (2006) (showing correlations between changes in 
rankings, volume of law school applications, and school selectivity ranking). But
see Rachel F. Moran, Of Rankings and Regulation: Are the U.S. News & World 
Report Rankings Really A Subversive Force in Legal Education?, 81 IND. L.J.
383, 383-99 (2006) (asserting that “any discussion of the market in legal 
education [is] . . . lopsided when it focuses on the impact of rankings and ignores 
. . . barriers to innovation” engendered by the ABA accreditation process itself). 
 243. TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 180.  
 244. Id. at 179.  
 245. See id. at 178-79. But for a thorough criticism of Tamanaha’s 
understanding of “student loan repayment methods,” see generally Philip G. 
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A thoroughgoing public policy analysis of government 
loan policies would be an interesting exercise. Presumably, 
the analysis would focus on whether the interest of society 
is served by subsidizing the opportunity to obtain and 
acquire the skills necessary for entering a profession, skills 
that can be put in service of the public, even though the 
opportunity might come at a substantial cost to the 
individual. Tamanaha chides “liberal law professors,” who 
propose social justice agendas in law schools, for 
participating in an enterprise that rewards them (with high 
salaries, low teaching loads, and very little supervision), but 
hinders their students from choosing to assist the poor and 
the middle class.246
Nonetheless, according to Tamanaha, the root of the 
problem lies in the accreditation standards, which mandate 
a one-size-fits-all model. 
Accredited law schools today have a three-year curriculum taught 
by law professors who are scholars more than lawyers, while the 
bar incessantly complains that graduates are inadequately 
prepared for the practice of law. . . . The proposition that students 
could be trained for practice solely in law school was wrongheaded 
from the outset. The best way to learn how to practice law is to 
actually do it.247
To reduce the high cost of legal education, Tamanaha 
argues, the ABA standards should be adjusted to allow for 
multiple varieties of legal education.248 “Academic” law 
schools emphasizing scholarly pursuits should be allowed to 
continue their mission. But other law schools should be 
freed up to educate lawyers in a less costly fashion, perhaps 
Schrag, Failing Law Schools—Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 387 (2013). 
 246. TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 35. According to Tamanaha, the practices 
tolerated in law schools would never be tolerated in the idealized private firms 
that he imagines operating in a perfect market. Market discipline apparently 
would prevent such things from happening. But we know all too well that 
perfect markets do not exist in the real world, that private firms are notorious 
for rent-seeking, and that they often succeed in passing on the costs of their 
inefficiencies to consumers.  
 247. TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 172.  
 248. See id. at 172-73.  
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by reducing the core term of study to two years or allowing 
graduates of nonaccredited law schools to take the bar 
examination.249
Tamanaha envisions a world in which legal education is 
delivered by schools comparable “in program and pricing” to 
“vocational colleges and community colleges.”250 A solution 
that analogizes a subclass of law schools to community 
colleges obviously envisions a legal profession quite 
different from that which currently exists in the United 
States or in most other capitalist democracies. Moreover, a 
world in which scholarship and proposals for law reform 
emanate only from a narrow range of elite law schools 
should also be cause for concern in a large and diverse 
democracy.  
For Tamanaha, it is time to acknowledge what U.S. 
News has already signified and validated, and what 
everyone has known for a very long time. We have a 
segmented and stratified law school market from top to 
bottom, training lawyers to do different legal tasks in 
different legal markets. Why force all students to be 
educated under one expensive umbrella, focused on 
scholarship and costly library and research infrastructures? 
There should be “[r]esearch-oriented law schools” and 
“practice-oriented” schools, “staffed by experienced lawyers 
teaching full time or as adjuncts.”251 For those institutions 
continuing on a three-year track, a third year devoted to 
practice-readiness (with a change in the standards) would 
revive a version of the long-abandoned apprenticeship 
method.252
 249. See id. at 173-76.  
 250. Id. at 174. For a critique of Tamanaha’s proposal, see Jay Sterling Silver, 
The Case Against Tamanaha’s Motel 6 Model of Legal Education, 60 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 50, 50 (2012), http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/60-
4.pdf (concluding that a two-year course of law study would not succeed because 
of “the pedagogical needs of law students, the interests of the clients of fledgling 
attorneys, and the role law professors have traditionally played in championing 
legal reform and the rights of the disenfranchised through enlightened 
scholarship”). 
 251. TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 174. 
 252. See id. at 175-76.  
2014] THE WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT  731
One suggestion is that practice-readiness could be 
accomplished through placements with practitioners,253 but 
it is not clear why such an arrangement would suit 
practitioners or students. Practitioners might be willing to 
pay a meager wage to students while they learn to practice, 
but they are unlikely to do so. Like recent graduates, 
students may prove to be a net drag on operations and they 
may well leave to work for a competitor. More likely, the 
firms willing to devote substantial resources to teaching and 
mentoring students would require payments from either the 
law schools or the students. In addition, it not clear what 
kind and amount of mentoring would occur in busy law 
offices, let alone what uniformity of educational experience 
could be achieved in quite distinct, idiosyncratic 
placements.254
Another possibility is that law schools will provide more 
of this training themselves, but that possibility also 
presents difficulties.255 The point of requiring law schools to 
provide more practical training is to shift training costs 
from employers to the law schools. Each sector of the 
profession is likely to argue that the skills most needed by 
 253. See id. at 175.  
 254. There are approximately 45,000 third-year law students in the United 
States each year. See Jennifer Smith, Crop of New Law Schools Open Amid a 
Lawyer Glut, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2013, at B1. Even if that number were to 
decrease substantially in coming years, it is difficult to imagine how the 
requisite number of third-year placements, properly supervised, could be found, 
given the fact that there are only about 760,000 law “jobs” in the United States. 
Occupational Outlook Handbook, Lawyers, BUREAU LAB. STATISTICS (Jan. 8,
2014), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/lawyers.htm (“Number of jobs, 2012: 
759,800”). In addition, many of those lawyers practice in geographical locations, 
practice settings, or professional specialties that might make them unlikely 
candidates for third-year practice placements. Finally, an even smaller number 
might be qualified and willing to provide the kind of supervision that is 
essential to meaningful experiential learning. Unless placements are carefully 
supervised, students may be exploited or neglected. In order to control the 
quality of education for practice-readiness, law schools may be faced with very 
costly and time-consuming responsibilities. See also Karl N. Llewellyn, On What 
Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV 651, 668 (1935) 
(“‘Why worry in the schools about apprenticeship? The men [sic] get it?’ But how 
many get it? And with whom? And under what conditions favorable to learning? 
Do you know? Does anybody?”). 
 255. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 174.  
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neophyte lawyers in that sector are those that should 
receive the greatest investment by law schools. Otherwise, 
the costs of doing business in that sector will increase 
because training costs will not be externalized. It is not 
necessarily a foregone conclusion, however, that those are 
the skills that law schools should teach, even to those 
desiring to work in that sector. What is essential to a 
student’s long-term employment interests is not necessarily 
the same as the set of skills with which an employer would 
like to see an entry-level employee equipped prior to his or 
her start date. 
Tamanaha is refreshingly candid about his goal: the 
creation of “a differentiated legal education system” (really 
a market) to match or mirror the legal job or career 
market.256 He seems to suggest that we actually need two 
legal professions (or maybe more) trained differently to do 
different things (perhaps with different values or with 
different ethical norms and perhaps even defined differently 
professionally).257 While the elite bar, the ABA, and law 
schools succeeded a century ago in creating a set of rules 
aimed at excluding from the profession people they 
considered to be socially unworthy, and, failing that, to 
relegate them to the periphery of the profession,258 those 
efforts largely failed. Many of those who had been deemed 
unworthy eventually came to occupy the top ranks of the 
profession, and some became champions of a different vision 
of America, one in which merit mattered more than gender, 
race, religion, or social class, and one in which graduates of 
the lowest-ranked schools could ultimately achieve the 
highest success. Tamanaha would redefine both legal 
education and the profession to put back in place the social 
checkpoints that once were so powerful. Indeed, he would 
make them virtually insurmountable. Ironically, he would 
do that in the name of increasing access to legal education 
and to legal services.  
 256. See id. at 172-76.  
 257. See id. at 174.  
 258. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
IN MODERN AMERICA 40-53 (1976).  
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The formal segmentation of the profession championed 
by Tamanaha is profoundly undemocratic; it is certainly 
contrary to deeply ingrained American values of equality 
and equal opportunity; and it will certainly restrict social 
mobility by closing one of the avenues that has been most 
successful in fostering such mobility. To prescribe that 
certain kinds of people should be the clients of lawyers who 
are certain kinds of people also goes a long way toward 
stigmatizing both clients and lawyers. Over this layer of 
social and economic “realism,” Tamanaha superimposes a 
dystopian vision of the creative destruction of some of the 
traditional roles and functions of the bar, shifting and 
changing, responding to short-term economic crisis, long-
term structural changes, globalization, technology, 
competition, and so forth. Those who are not called to 
participate in elite markets will become robotic scriveners, 
mass processing simple and ordinary transactions for people 
previously deprived of legal services, and receiving low 
levels of compensation to match their lower tuitions, lower 
debt burdens, and inescapably lower social status.  
In some sense at least, Tamanaha’s argument takes for 
granted that the elite law schools are doing a great job, 
presumably because their graduates do well in securing 
very remunerative entry-level positions.259 But law schools 
with the greatest name recognition, the largest alumni 
networks, and so forth, are destined to have the best job 
placement and starting salary data. They will also attract 
the best students, regardless of price. Competition among 
law schools seems to be driven by the perceived value of the 
degree rather than by price. Unless their educational 
programs are demonstrably worse than everyone else’s, they 
will continue to attract the best students and reward them 
accordingly.  
 259. See Karen Sloan, The Go-To Law Schools: A Special Report, NAT’L L.J., 
Feb. 27, 2012, at 11. But some studies suggest that the graduates of some lower-
ranked schools, although employed in smaller numbers by the large firms, 
actually do as well or better at those firms over the long term. See, e.g., Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Do Elite Law Grads Disdain Longtime BigLaw Work? Stats 
Suggest Lower-Tier ‘Strivers’ Stick Around, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 12, 2012, 4:30 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/do_elite_law_grads_disdain_longtime_
biglaw_work_stats_suggest_lower-tier. 
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In a world of this construction, they will be deemed the 
“best” law schools. That may be the way of the world, but it 
is no reason to say, as Tamanaha seems to do, that there is 
no point in having upstart schools nipping at the heels of 
their elite sisters, that we should freeze the frame where we 
are, declare the competition concluded, and award the 
prizes and the riches—institutional and individual—to 
those who have already succeeded.260
As Tamanaha would have it, those who do not gain 
admission to an elite law school, but make the foolhardy 
choice to go to law school nonetheless, are destined for 
second-class citizenship in the legal profession.261 Whether 
the criteria used in those admissions decisions are really the 
criteria that should be used to select the most promising 
future lawyers is one question.262 A more serious one, 
perhaps, stems from the fact that the top ranks of the legal 
profession in America, including many of the elite law firms 
and some of the highest benches, have not insubstantial 
numbers of graduates of non-elite law schools.263 That 
 260. Ironically, Tamanaha seems to believe that competition between 
segments of the law school “industry” is unwise and can be avoided as long as 
everyone understands and accepts their place. TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 172-
76. And he seems to think that the competition between law schools will wither 
away if only the accreditation standards or the U.S. News rankings would 
disappear. See id. If one were to take those factors out of the equation, however, 
there is no reason to suspect that schools will not continue to compete, but 
instead will continue to seek ways to differentiate themselves from each other 
on other grounds such as strength of program, specialization, and geographical 
advantages. Students may pay a premium because of accreditation 
requirements, but they are likely to continue to pay a premium based on other 
elements schools use to separate themselves from the competition. 
 261. See id.
 262. See, e.g., Pamela Edwards, The Shell Game: Who Is Responsible for the 
Overuse of the LSAT in Law School Admissions?, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 165 
(2006) (“A strong first step [in deemphasizing use of the LSAT in law school 
admission decisions] would be to encourage U.S. News & World Report to reflect 
the values of the academy when determining the factors it uses to calculate law 
school rankings.”); Phoebe A. Haddon & Deborah W. Post, Misuse and Abuse of 
the LSAT: Making the Case for Alternative Evaluative Efforts and a Redefinition 
of Merit, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 41, 91 (2006) (arguing that law school admissions 
committees over-rely on the LSAT).  
 263. Theodore P. Seto, Where Do Partners Come from?, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 242, 
244-45 tbl. 1 (2012) (listing the top fifty feeder schools for partners in the NLJ 
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diversity is not only healthy but essential to a democratic 
society.264 Does anyone really believe that a Supreme Court 
staffed entirely by graduates of Harvard and Yale is a good 
thing? But that is the world that Tamanaha would have us 
validate.265
Whether law schools should be two years or three;266
whether they should admit students with two or three years 
100 and demonstrating that thousands of partners hail from non-elite schools). 
For a critique of Seto’s methodology, see Robert Anderson, Bloated Is Better for 
Law School Rankings, WITNESSETH: LAW, DEALS, & DATA (Dec. 14, 2012, 1:23 
AM), http://witnesseth.typepad.com/blog/2012/12/bloated-is-better-for-law-
school-rankings.html. 
 264. See William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Pedigree Problem: 
Are Law School Ties Choking the Profession?, A.B.A. J., July 2012, at 36, 37
(“This near obsession with pedigree is not only paralyzing to the career 
prospects of individual lawyers; it is damaging to the entire profession.”). 
 265. Paradoxically, as employment opportunities have decreased, the number 
of law schools has increased. The number of ABA-accredited law schools has 
increased from 135 in 1964 to 201 in 2011. AM. BAR ASS’N, ENROLLMENT AND 
DEGREES AWARDED: 1963-2012 ACADEMIC YEARS 1 (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_
and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckd
am.pdf. To most observers, this development seems like lunacy. See, e.g., Elie 
Mystal, Someone at the ABA Is Aware That New Law Schools Make No Sense,
ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 5, 2012, 4:12PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/10/at-least-
one-person-at-the-aba-is-aware-that-new-law-schools-make-no-sense. Perhaps 
some of the new schools will succeed, while some existing schools will vanish. 
That has happened in the past. According to Ritchie, there were more law 
students enrolled in 1930 than in the 1950s (although the 1930s enrollment 
figures doubled those of the 1920s), and while there were 190 “degree 
conferring” law schools in 1940, there were only 159 in 1964. Ritchie, supra note 
195, at 177-78. Those numbers have fluctuated over time for various economic, 
political, and professional reasons. Indeed, as Bryant Garth has perceptively 
reminded us, much of today’s crisis rhetoric about legal education and “too many 
lawyers” bears striking similarities to that of the 1930s and the Great 
Depression. Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and Competition in Legal 
Education: A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal 
Profession and Legal Education, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 509 (2013). 
 266. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, The Roosevelt-Cardozo Way: The Case for 
Bar Eligibility After Two Years of Law School, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
599, 599 (2012) (arguing “for a revision of the rules of the New York Court of 
Appeals to allow students to sit for the bar after two years of law school classes 
whether or not the law school requires three years to obtain a degree”); see also 
Adam J. T.W. White, Upholding the Oath of Competency While Filling the 
Indigent Void: Why the Law School Curriculum Should Be Extended to A Fourth 
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of preprofessional education without requiring all to have 
an undergraduate degree;267 whether they should offer legal 
studies and the study of other disciplines simultaneously or 
sequentially; whether they should accept only students who 
have a substantial amount of work experience (as many 
business schools do);268 whether they currently allocate too 
Year, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 425, 450-57 (2010). Presumably, a two-year law 
degree would not be considered a doctoral degree but a professional master’s 
degree akin to an MBA. Such a change might have implications for a variety of 
practices and norms in legal education, including the qualifications for law 
school faculty hiring, judicial clerkship applications, and the continued existence 
of student-edited law reviews. 
 267. A number of law schools permit qualified undergraduates to enroll after 
three years of undergraduate study; some schools restrict this option to its 
university’s own undergraduate students, while others have agreements with 
other undergraduate institutions which allow their students the same 
opportunity. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL 
OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 218, at Standard 502(a); Elie Mystal, Are ‘3+3’ 
Programs a Good Idea?, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/11/are-3-3-programs-a-good-idea. Some law schools 
have also allowed its university’s undergraduates to enroll without taking the 
LSAT. See, e.g., Doctor of Jurisprudence: How to Apply, MAURER SCH. L.,
http://law.indiana.edu/admissions/jd/apply/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 
2014); Early Assurance Program, GEO. L., http://law.georgetown.edu/admissions-
financial-aid/jd-admissions/early-assurance-program (last visited Mar. 22, 
2014); Adele Shapiro, Breaking News! Applications Are Down! Law School 
Without the LSAT, KAPLAN LSAT BLOG (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://blog.kaplanlsat.com/2013/02/01/breaking-news-applications-are-down-law-
school-without-the-lsat. 
 268. In recent years, Northwestern Law School places more weight on work 
experience in its admission decision than most schools. In the class entering in 
September and May of 2013, 91% of students have had one or more years of full-
time work. See Class Profile, NW. L. SCH., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
admissions/profile (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). Reflecting the emphasis on work 
experience in admission decisions, the average age at matriculation for the 
traditional entering class was twenty-five. Traditional 3-Year JD Class Profile,
NW. L. SCH., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/admissions/profile/jdprofile.html 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2014). In addition, the median years of work experience for 
the accelerated JD class was six, Accelerated JD Class Profile, NW. L.
SCH., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/admissions/profile/AJDprofile.html (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2014), and for the joint JD/MBA entering class, the average 
years of full-time experience was 4.75. JD-MBA Class Profile, NW. L.
SCH., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/admissions/profile/jdmbaprofile.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2014).  
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many resources to scholarship and law reform activities;269
whether they pay too much or too little attention to “skills” 
training;270 whether they currently teach the skills that 
today’s and tomorrow’s lawyers will need to have 
mastered;271 whether they should be skeptical of the self-
interested demands of legal employers for “practice-ready” 
entry-level lawyers; whether they should train students for 
their long-term professional needs; whether they can make 
legal education more affordable; and whether they can 
successfully educate lawyers to provide efficient and cost-
effective professional services to those who otherwise could 
not afford representation are all important questions.272 If 
we do not know, however, what specific role we expect 
lawyers to play in a democratic society and a market 
economy; if we do not know what lawyers really need to 
know to fulfill their necessary roles and live a good life too—
 269. See, e.g., Maimon Schwarzschild, The Ethics and Economics of American 
Legal Education Today, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 10 (2008) (arguing that 
law schools place too much emphasis on scholarship, leading to an institutional 
breakdown that has “lowered academic morale dramatically”).  
 270. See generally David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Taking Lawyering Skills 
Training Seriously, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 191, 219 (2003) (concluding “that the 
case-centered approach to clinical education . . . does not adequately foster” the 
lawyering skills students need); Ellie Margolis & Susan L. DeJarnatt, Moving 
Beyond Product to Process: Building a Better LRW Program, 46 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 93, 135-36 (2005) (discussing how legal research and writing should be 
taught); Richard A. Matasar, Skills and Values Education: Debate About the 
Continuum Continues, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 395, 428 (2003) (“[T]he 
commitment to skills and values education advocated over the last ten years has 
had a measurable impact on legal education.”).  
 271. See Margolis & DeJarnatt, supra note 270, at 135-36. 
 272. The possible consequences of the answers to these questions are not 
obvious, particularly for disadvantaged or less well-educated students. For 
instance, it may take longer under certain circumstances to acquire basic skills 
and experiences necessary for the successful practice of law in any environment, 
and it is not easy to measure the tradeoff between incurring cost and debt, on 
the one hand, and the opportunity to acquire useful skills, on the other hand. If 
the educational process takes longer, it may pay off in better long term 
prospects and opportunities that turn out to be cost-effective for some students 
as they take the full measure of professional culture. See generally Bryant Garth 
& Joyce Sterling, Exploring Inequality in the Corporate Law Firm 
Apprenticeship: Doing the Time, Finding the Love, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1361 
(2009). 
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it seems obvious that law schools have much work to do 
before they can begin to tackle those programmatic 
questions.
III. 
We are told that we have entered an increasingly 
integrated and interrelated world—a dynamic, complex, and 
intensely challenging world that stresses interdisciplinary 
and multidisciplinary problem-solving. Indeed, one can 
hardly imagine the world that will exist when the lawyers 
now entering the profession reach senior status. Yet we are 
also told that less formal legal education will suffice for 
most of the practicing bar. Presumably, they will pick up 
whatever else they need as they go along. Such an education 
will suffice, of course, only if most students and most of the 
bar are content to lower their sights, leaving to those who 
are fortunate enough to overcome the obstacle of securing 
admission to a highly ranked law school all of the influence, 
prestige, and financial rewards to which all could at least 
aspire in the past. This dynamic world of challenges and 
opportunities is to be placed out of reach of most law 
graduates. For law schools, as for individual lawyers, one’s 
place in the great chain of being, the hierarchy of worth, is 
to be entrenched. There are no second chances. Where one 
begins will determine where one will end up. 
For hundreds of years now, American lawyers have 
talked about what the profession should be, how it should 
be defined, what role it should play in a democratic society, 
and how those who aspire to membership in the profession 
should be educated to prepare them for their life’s work. 
The best American lawyers have also thought hard about 
the ambiguity of their cultural and moral position; they 
have long recognized that their tools can be used for good or 
ill; and they have known that the credibility and ultimate 
vitality of their profession depends on the recognition that 
they owe real duties to the public as well as to their clients 
and themselves. The public, too, have long recognized that a 
society built on law cannot flourish without the work of 
professionally trained men and women who are committed 
to advancing the public’s interest as well as their own and 
that of their clients. The public, no less than the lawyers 
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themselves, have recognized the inherent difficulty of that 
position and the many opportunities that exist for the ideal 
to be compromised in practice. But the public have expected 
the profession to discharge that complex and sometimes 
ambiguous set of responsibilities to the best of its abilities. 
In his essay on liberal education, William Cronon wrote that 
“[i]n the end, it turns out that liberty is not about thinking 
or saying or doing whatever we want. It is about exercising 
our freedom in such a way as to make a difference in the 
world and make a difference for more than just ourselves.”273
That also is an apt description of the moral purpose, as well 
as the moral challenges, that are inherent in the lawyer’s 
role.  
Early in the nineteenth century, law professors (who 
often were also well-respected practitioners or jurists) were 
wont to wax poetic on celebratory occasions about the 
inherently public nature of the legal profession. Even 
discounting for the self-serving nature and congratulatory 
tones of these professional self-justifications, the vision 
underlying the rhetoric is both obvious and striking. 
According to these orators, lawyers were “public sentinel[s]” 
providing a “public service,”274 protecting against the 
invasion of rights, whether through the actions of other 
individuals or by the state. Indeed, they were perceived to 
be “the ministering officers in the temple of justice,” to 
whom
the injured resort, for redress of their wrongs; the doubting and 
perplexed, for the solution of their difficulties; the oppressed, for 
relief; the dying, for the final arrangements of their worldly 
wealth; the widow and the orphan, for their violated rights; and 
 273. William Cronon, “Only Connect . . .”: The Goals of A Liberal Education,
AM. SCHOLAR, Autumn 1998, at 73, 79. 
 274. JOSEPH STORY, A DISCOURSE PRONOUNCED UPON THE INAUGURATION OF THE 
AUTHOR, AS DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY, ON THE TWENTY-
FIFTH DAY OF AUGUST, 1829, at 25 (1829). It should be noted that casting 
lawyers as clothed in public responsibilities also had a distinct political message 
and content in its age that has evolved or shifted over time, situating the legal 
profession in the early nineteenth century as guardians against the excesses of 
democracy.  
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all for the preservation and security of whatever is valuable in 
life, or its modes of enjoyment . . . .275
These addresses emphasize nothing so much as the 
notion of service in the administration of justice, broadly 
construed. In their variety of roles, lawyers were portrayed 
as responsible for ensuring that a robust set of rights were 
protected and valid obligations enforced, so that a vital civil 
society would be bound together and its work accomplished. 
Through the professional representation of private 
interests, lawyers were thought to fulfill a public purpose. 
The practice of law has always been embedded in 
commerce, and the organization and market for legal 
services has changed often over time. The key question 
remains how lawyers should be trained and what values 
they should hold if they are to flourish in a profession that 
is embedded in commerce and charged with protecting the 
interests of clients, but charged as well with advancing the 
public interest and treating the public’s business as its own. 
If we are to view Morgan’s book as an expression of acute 
cultural anxiety, the lament seems to rise up from elite 
practitioners (the traditional winners), who are fearful of 
losing their current status and prestige as they face 
competition in a global marketplace. That is a legitimate 
concern, and one that legal education must address, but it is 
not clear that that is the only concern—or even the 
principal one—with which law schools should be occupied.
Surely, law schools must be interested in providing the 
best education they reasonably can provide to all who would 
serve the legal needs of the public, without regard to how 
“important” or “unimportant” their clients might be, and 
without regard to how much money their clients’ problems 
might involve. Indeed, the tumultuous events of the past 
decade demonstrate, if anything, the importance of ensuring 
that the best possible legal education is provided, not only 
to those who are committed to representing big business, 
but also to those who will hold big business to account—by 
 275. SIMON GREENLEAF, A DISCOURSE PRONOUNCED AT THE INAUGURATION OF 
THE AUTHOR AS ROYALL PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY, AUGUST 26,
1834, at 11 (1834). 
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prosecuting criminal conduct, designing effective regulatory 
practices, and representing the victims of big business’s 
well-lawyered schemes to take advantage of the poor and 
the middle class.  
If those ends are to be achieved, the lawyers who 
represent the public and the victims of fraud and deceit 
must be every bit as well educated and every bit as 
sophisticated as those who represent big business. It also 
behooves law schools to find the means for providing a first-
class education for all of its students, and it behooves law 
schools to lead the way in developing the mechanisms and 
systems necessary for lawyers to represent clients, 
especially the poor and the middle class, in a cost-effective 
way. In this regard, one would hope that the wise use of 
technology and personnel management skills could lead to 
the more efficient and effective practice of law, rather than 
to the lawyer obsolescence that Morgan predicts. Law 
schools should be forward-looking and in the forefront of 
such efforts. 
There is no doubt, as Tamanaha asserts, that law 
schools, which “have long held themselves out as the 
conscience of the legal profession, . . . have been engaging in 
disreputable practices.”276 Indeed, there are so many known 
instances of fraud that one suspects that we have only seen 
the tip of the iceberg. At the very least, this fact ought to 
raise questions about leadership: about the kinds of people 
central administrations and law faculties choose to lead law 
schools, what their real qualifications for handling these 
positions are, what pressures they operate under, and what 
should be expected of them.
Tamanaha draws on his own experience as the interim 
dean of a law school in deep crisis. The picture he paints of 
his former colleagues is unremittingly negative: the senior 
faculty are described as nonproductive, intellectually 
uninteresting people, committed neither to teaching nor to 
scholarship, coasting toward a retirement that is better 
taken at full-pay in the classroom than on a pension.277 They 
 276. TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at x.  
 277. See id. at 4-8.  
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are not only shirkers, but proud of it.278 Tamanaha’s solution 
was to do something akin to declaring martial law.279 That 
might well have been the right course for that law school at 
that time, but that is not the essence of leadership in legal 
education or anywhere else.  
Tamanaha clearly overestimates the efficacy of top-
down management, whether in law schools or in business. 
Leaders do not generally lead effectively, or accomplish 
anything lasting, by means of coercion, rather than 
persuasion, or through the authority of office, rather than 
the manifestation of admirable personal qualities. 
Leadership is particularly difficult when the group to be led 
is not only highly educated, but professionally trained to see 
all sides of an issue, value reasoned opinion, and distrust 
fiat in all its forms. Leadership in such circumstances 
requires hard work: encouraging the development of a 
genuine sense of community built around a common vision, 
persuading the community that the vision is the right one 
for the time and place, and convincing the community to 
work toward the achievement of that vision for the common 
good.280 Leadership does not consist, in the words of 
Professor Morgan’s law firm chair, of learning how to “beat 
the donkeys” harder.281
In response to Tamanaha, let us be clear: the fact that 
we conceive of the legal profession and legal education as 
parts of the public domain, which must ultimately be 
evaluated in terms more enduring and comprehensive than 
short-term costs and benefits, should not be taken by 
anyone as an excuse for overlooking, let alone accepting, 
inflated or excessive costs in legal education. We take that 
 278. But see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Faculty Ethics in Law School: Shirking, 
Capture, and “The Matrix,” 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 397, 408 (2005) (arguing 
that just because law schools are vulnerable to shirking by professors does not 
mean it actually occurs).  
 279. See TAMANAHA, supra note 63, at 7.  
 280. See generally Ronald A. Heifetz & Riley A. Sinder, Political Leadership: 
Managing the Public’s Problem-Solving, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 179 
(Robert B. Reich ed., 1990). 
 281. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 3 (quoting Bario, supra note 140, at 114) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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problem as seriously as anyone, and we believe that it is 
imperative that a solution to rising costs, not only in law 
school but throughout higher education, be found. Higher 
education, and particularly professional legal education, 
cannot become the preserve of only those who are very rich 
or otherwise advantaged without threatening the very 
foundations of our democratic society. Nor can we be 
anything but deeply concerned about the employment 
prospects of our students. It is certainly the responsibility of 
law schools to be candid with students about past placement 
success and current prospects, and the decision to pursue 
legal studies should be a fully informed one. That all should 
go without saying. 
What we do mean to say—and think worthy of special 
emphasis—is that cost is not an independent variable. In 
addressing the question of cost, we need first to take 
thought on what we expect of the legal profession, and on 
the consequences for legal education that flow from those 
expectations. We need especially to take thought on the 
possible adverse consequences for our democratic society of 
suggested solutions such as the imposition of formal 
segmentation in legal education and the profession. In other 
words, we cannot decide on how to deliver the most cost-
effective legal education unless we first decide what an 
appropriate legal education entails. Thinking about how to 
produce the cheapest “legal education” without also 
thinking about what an appropriate legal education entails, 
as some would have us do, is as wrong-headed as refusing to 
think about cost at all. 
These are complex questions. But there is yet another 
inquiry to be made; it is at least as important and no less 
difficult, but it has largely escaped the critics’ notice. It is 
disconcerting that so little of the current conversation has 
addressed the subject of legal education from the 
perspective of the role that lawyers have played, and must 
continue to play, as citizens and leaders in our 
constitutional democracy, both locally and nationally, but 
also, increasingly, on a global stage. As Philip Jackson has 
observed, education is at least in part a process whereby a 
community transmits its values to those who wish to join 
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it.282 But it is difficult to imagine what kind of “cultural 
transmission” is meant to be effected through legal 
education when lawyers and law schools accept the 
proposition that the legal profession is simply an “industry”; 
that professional values are illusory and a form of deception 
that facilitates the exaction of monopoly profits; and that 
clients and students are simply customers. It is equally 
difficult, given those assumptions, to imagine how legal 
education can fulfill its role of effecting beneficial changes 
in individual characters, the society at large, or the world in 
general. If there is no such thing as the legal profession, no 
substance or truth to professional values, and no 
relationship with clients and students other than that 
defined by market values,283 it is no wonder that law schools 
are in crisis.  
In Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice O’Connor observed that 
“universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the 
training ground for a large number of our Nation’s 
leaders.”284 Justice O’Connor focused on leadership in its 
most immediately public meaning and manifestation, 
namely political leadership. But the type of leadership she 
described goes well beyond the examples she gave. Lawyers 
serve their communities in all sorts of ways. Representing 
people in the peaceful resolution of disputes, helping them 
achieve their goals by memorializing their intentions in 
documents that protect their rights and interests, guiding 
clients through the intricacies of commercial transactions or 
the regulatory requirements of the bureaucratic state—all 
of these are forms of leadership for the public writ large. It 
is such tasks, and society’s continuing need for them to be 
done, and done well, that may ultimately be at issue in 
these debates.
In 1877, John Randolph Tucker gave the 
commencement address at the University of Maryland 
School of Law. Tucker had an illustrious career: Attorney 
 282. See JACKSON, supra note 89, at 94.  
 283. See MORGAN, supra note 97, at 21 (“Lawyers . . . are not now a profession 
and—over most of their history—they have never been one.”). 
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General of Virginia under the Confederacy, General 
Counsel of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Dean of 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, postwar 
Congressman from Virginia, an accomplished advocate who 
defended the Haymarket Anarchists, President of the ABA, 
and author of one of the leading treatises on American 
constitutional law.285 He lived in a period of extraordinary 
change, which he personally navigated with considerable 
dexterity. His words to the Maryland graduates of 1877 
provide a fitting coda to this essay. He said: “Many think 
every thing good because old, and everything evil because 
new; others directly reverse these propositions. Neither is 
right; both are in error. Change is not reform; nor is a blind 
conservation of the established order of things, wisdom.”286
We, too, live in a period of extraordinary change, which 
poses substantial challenges for legal education and the 
practice of law. We cannot stand on “the established order of 
things.” Still less can we go back. But it behooves us to 
reflect on the likely consequences of one possible change or 
another, and to take thought on what needs to be changed 
and what needs to be retained, as we engage the great 
projects of renewal and reconstruction that surely await us. 
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